











Faculté des sciences 
économiques et de 
gestion
Pôle européen de gestion et 
d'économie (PEGE)




Tél. : (33) 03 90 24 20 69











« Regular distributive efficiency and the 
















   1 
Regular distributive efficiency and the distributive liberal social contract 
 
 
Jean Mercier Ythier 
Université de Metz  
BETA 
Institut d’Economie Publique 
 




We consider abstract social systems of private property, made of n individuals endowed with non-paternalistic 
interdependent preferences, who interact through exchanges on competitive markets and Pareto-efficient lump-
sum transfers. The transfers follow from a distributive liberal social contract defined as a redistribution of initial 
endowments such that the resulting market equilibrium allocation is, both, Pareto-efficient relative to individual 
interdependent preferences, and unanimously weakly preferred to the initial market equilibrium. We elicit the 
global  structure  of  the  set  of  Pareto-efficient  allocations:  its  relative  interior  is  a  simply  connected  smooth 
manifold of dimension n-1, homeomorphic to the relative interior of the unit-simplex of 
n ℝ . The property 
obtains  under  three  suitable  conditions  on  the  partial  preordering  of  Pareto  associated  with  individual 
interdependent preferences, which essentially state that: the social utility functions built from weighted sums of 
individual interdependent utilities, by means of arbitrary positive weights, exhibit a property of differentiable 
non-satiation and some suitably defined property of inequality aversion; and individuals have diverging views on 
redistribution,  in  some  suitable  sense,  at  (inclusive)  distributive  optima.  The  set  of  market  equilibrium 
allocations  associated  with  the  transfers  of  the  inclusive  distributive  liberal  social  contracts  consists  of  the 
allocations that are unanimously weakly preferred to the initial market equilibrium and that maximize, in the set 
of attainable allocations, weighted sums of individual interdependent utilities derived from suitable vectors of 
positive  weights  of 
n
++ ℝ .    Its  relative  interior  is  a  simply  connected  smooth  manifold  of  dimension  n-1 
whenever the initial market equilibrium is not Pareto-efficient relative to individual interdependent preferences.  
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This article derives the global structure of the set of Pareto-efficient distributions of wealth, 
and  its  subset  of  distributive  liberal  social  contracts,  in  abstract  social  systems  made  of 
individuals owners endowed with non-paternalistic interdependent preferences, who interact 
by means of competitive market exchange and Pareto-improving lump-sum redistribution. 
 
Wealth  distribution  is  formally  analogous  to  a  pure  public  good  in  the  presence  of  non-
paternalistic  utility  interdependence  (Kolm,  1966,  Hochman  and  Rodgers,  1969,  and  the 
subsequent literature on Pareto optimal redistribution reviewed in Mercier Ythier, 2006:  6.1). 
  Pareto efficiency moreover admits two distinct definitions in this setup, namely, the 
Pareto efficiency relative to individuals’ preferences over their own consumption of market 
commodities,  thereafter  named  market  efficiency,  and  the  Pareto  efficiency  relative  to 
individuals’ preferences over the whole allocation of resources, labelled distributive efficiency 
in the sequel. The two definitions articulate consistently, in the sense that the latter implies the 
former, subject to a mild assumption of non-satiation of the partial preordering of Pareto 
associated  with  individual  preference  relations  over  allocation.  The  second  fundamental 
theorem of welfare economics then applies to distributive Pareto optima, that is, distributive 
optima are Walrasian equilibria relative to suitable vectors of market prices and individual   2 
endowments (Winter, 1969, Archibald and Donaldson, 1978, and the subsequent literature 
reviewed in Mercier Ythier, 2006:  4.1.2). 
  These  theoretical  facts  open  on  the  possibility  of  consistently  articulating  market 
exchange and redistribution within a liberal social contract (Kolm, 1985, 1987ab, 1996: 5 and 
2004: Chap. 3). The latter is characterized below as the subset of distributive Pareto optima 
that are unanimously weakly preferred to some initial Walrasian equilibrium.
1 This notion 
provides a normative reference for optimal redistribution, defined in the ideal conditions of 
perfect  contracting  in  market  exchange  and  social  contract  redistribution:  from  a  given 
Walrasian  equilibrium  that  is  not  a  distributive  optimum,  Pareto-improving  lump-sum 
transfers  are  performed  on  the  initial  distribution  of  individual  endowments,  so  that  the 
resulting Walrasian equilibrium yields a distributive optimum unanimously preferred to the 
initial Walrasian equilibrium. 
 
While the focus of this article is the normative analysis of the redistribution of wealth, it must 
be noted that the formal setup developed below implies, as a special case, an important special 
case of the standard model of general equilibrium with pure public goods (e.g. Foley, 1970, 
Conley, 1994). This formal equivalence obtains with an assumption of weak separability of 
individuals’ allocation preferences relative to their own private consumption, and a suitable 
reinterpretation of commodities (see footnotes 
4 and 
18 below, and also Mercier Ythier, 2006: 
3.3.3 and 6.1). The distributive liberal social contract, properly reinterpreted, may therefore 
provide a normative reference not only for optimal redistribution but also, more generally, for 
the optimal provision of any type of pure public good. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 set (section 2) and interpret (section 3) the 
general equilibrium framework for the analysis of Pareto optimal redistribution. Section 4 
draws the consequences of the public good characteristics of the distribution of wealth in 
terms  of  the  price-supportability  of  distributive  optima  and  associate  notion  of  price 
equilibrium. Section 5 first sets the regularity conditions for a well-behaved set of liberal 
social contract solutions to optimal redistribution (subsection 5.1), next examines examples of 
degenerate  solutions  to  the  same  problem  (subsection  5.2),  and  finally  elicits  sufficient 
conditions  on  individual  preferences  for  regular  distributive  efficiency  (subsection  5.3). 
Section 6 defines a notion of social  contract equilibrium that  yields a  determinate liberal 
social contract solution to optimal redistribution. Section 7 is a brief conclusion. 
 
2-Pareto optimal redistribution in a general equilibrium setup
2 
 




There  are  n  individuals  denoted  by  an  index  i  running  in  { } 1,..., N n = ,  and  l  goods  and 
services, denoted by an index h running in  { } 1,..., L l = . We let  2 n ³  and  1 l ³  in the sequel, 
that is, we consider social systems with at least two agents and at least one commodity (the 
special case  1 l =  is studied in Mercier Ythier, 1997, whose main results are subsumed in the 
results of the present study, and notably in Theorems 2 and 5). 
                                                 
1  See Mercier Ythier, 2007: 1, for an informal derivation of this characterization of the distributive liberal social 
contract and a brief discussion of some of its relations with the general notion of Kolm, 1985. See also Mercier 
Ythier, 1998, and 2006: 6.1, for a formal derivation of the same characterization in a game-theoretic setup. 
2  This section is, for the main part of it, an abridged version of the sections 2 and 3 of Mercier Ythier, 2007 and 
2009.    3 
 
The final destination of goods and services is individual consumption. A consumption of 
individual i is a vector ( ) 1,..., i il x x  of quantities of his consumption of commodities, denoted 
by  xi.  The  entries  of  xi  are  nonnegative  by  convention,  corresponding  to  demands  in  the 
abstract exchange economy outlined below. An allocation is a vector  ( ) 1,..., n x x , denoted by 
x. 
Individuals  exchange  commodities  on  a  complete  system  of  perfectly  competitive 
markets. There is, consequently, for each commodity h, a unique market price, denoted by ph, 
which  agents  take  as  given  (that  is,  as  independent  from  their  consumption,  exchange  or 
transfer decisions, including their collective transfer decisions if any). We let  ( ) 1, , l p p p = ¼ . 
Transfer decisions are made by coalitions, formally defined as any nonempty subset I 
of N, which may possibly be reduced to a single individual. A transfer of commodity h from 
individual i to individual j is a nonnegative quantity tijh. We let:  ( ) 1   , ,  ij ij ijl t t t = ¼  denote i’s 
commodity transfers to j;  ( )
: i ij j j i t t
¹ =  denote the collection of  i’s transfers to others (viewed 
as a row-vector of 
( 1) l n-
+ ℝ ). A collection of transfers of the grand coalition N is denoted by t, 
that is:  1 ( , , ) n t t t = ¼ . 
 
We make the following assumptions on commodity quantities: (i) they are perfectly divisible; 
(ii) the total quantity of each commodity is given once and for all (exchange economy with 
fixed total resources) and equal to 1 (the latter is a simple choice of units of measurement of 
commodities); (iii) an allocation x is attainable if it verifies the aggregate resource constraint 
of the economy, specified as follows: ∑ Î £
N i ih x 1 for all h (this definition of attainability 
implies free disposal).  
The  vector  of  total  initial  resources  of  the  economy,  that  is,  the  diagonal  vector 
( ) 1, ,1 ¼  of 
l ℝ , is denoted by  r . The set of attainable allocations  { : }
nl
i i N x x r + Î Î £ ∑ ℝ  is 
denoted by A. 
 
The society is a society of private property. In particular, the total resources of the economy 
are owned by its individual members. The initial ownership or endowment of individual i in 
commodity h is a nonnegative quantity  ih w . The vector  1 ( ,..., ) i in w w  of i’s initial endowments 
is denoted by  i w . We have  i i Nw r
Î = ∑  by assumption. The initial distribution  1 ( ,..., ) n w w  is 
denoted by w .  
 
Individuals  have  preference  preorderings  over  allocation,  which  are  well-defined  (that  is, 
reflexive and transitive) and complete. The allocation preferences of every individual i are 
assumed  separable  in  his  own  consumption,  that  is,  i’s  preference  preordering  induces  a 
unique  preordering  on  i’s  consumption  set  for  all  i.  We  suppose  that  preferences  can  be 
represented by utility functions. In particular, the preferences of individual i over his own 
consumption, as induced by his allocation preferences, are represented by the (“private”, or 
“market”)  utility  function  :
l
i u + ® ℝ ℝ,  which  we  will  sometimes  also  name  ophelimity 
function  by  reference  to  Pareto  (1913  and  1916).  The  product  function 
1 1 1 1 1 ( ,..., ):( ,..., ) ( ( ),..., ( )) n n n n n u pr u pr x x u x u x ®     ⋱,  where  pri  denotes  the  i-th  canonical 
projection  1 ( ,..., ) n i x x x ® , is denoted by u. Finally, we suppose that individual allocation 
preferences verify the following hypothesis of non-paternalistic utility interdependence: For   4 
all i, there exists a (“social”, or “distributive”) utility function  : ( )
nl
i w u + ® ℝ ℝ, increasing in 
its  i-th  argument,  such  that  the  product  function  1 1 1 :( ,..., ) ( ( ),..., ( )) i n i n n w u x x w u x u x ®    
represents  i’s  allocation  preferences.  Whenever  i’s  distributive  utility  is  increasing  in  j’s 
ophelimity, this means that individual i endorses j’s consumption preferences within his own 
allocation  preferences  (“non-paternalism”).
3  For  the  sake  of  clarity,  we  reserve  the  terms 
“individual distributive utility function” for functions of the type wi and “individual social 
utility  function”  for  functions  of  the  type  i w u   .  The  terms  “individual  distributive 
preferences” and “individual social preferences”, on the contrary, are used as synonymous, 
and designate individual preference relations over allocation, in short, individual allocation 
preferences. 
  Individual private utilities are normalized so that  (0) 0 i u =  for all i. Naturally, this can 
be done without loss of generality, due to the ordinal character of allocation preferences. 
  We let w denote the product function  1 1 ( ,..., ): ( ( ),..., ( )) n n w w û w û w û ® , defined on 
( )
nl u + ℝ . 
  We use as synonymous the following pairs of properties of the preference preordering 
and its utility representations: smooth (C
r, with  1 r ³ ) preordering, and smooth (C
r) utility 
representations;   monotone (resp. strictly monotone, resp. differentiably strictly monotone) 
preordering, and increasing (resp. strictly increasing, resp. differentiably strictly increasing) 
utility  representations;  convex  (resp.  strictly  convex,  resp.  differentiably  strictly  convex) 
preordering,  and  quasi-concave  (resp.  strictly  quasi-concave,  resp.  differentiably  strictly 
quasi-concave)  utility  representations.  Their  definitions  are  recalled,  for  the  sole  utility 
representations, in footnote 
5 below. 
 
A social system is a list  ( ) , , w u r  of social and private utility functions of individuals, and 
aggregate initial resources in consumption commodities. A social system of private property 
is a list  ( ) , , w u w , that is, a social system where the total resources of society are owned by 
individuals and initially distributed between them according to distribution ω.
4 
                                                 
3 Note that non-paternalistic utility interdependence does not imply distributive benevolence, in the sense of 
individual distributive utilities increasing in some others’ ophelimities. It is compatible, in particular, with the 
distributive  indifference  of  an  individual  i  relative  to  any  other  individual  j,  that  is,  the  constancy  of  i’s 
distributive utility in j’s ophelimity in some open subset of domain  ( )
nl u + ℝ  (“local” distributive indifference of i 
relative to j) or in the whole of it (“global” indifference). It is compatible, also: with local or global distributive 
malevolence,  in  the  sense  of  individual  distributive  utilities  decreasing  in  some  others’  ophelimities;  and, 
naturally, with any possible combination of local benevolence, indifference or malevolence of any individual 
relative to any other.   
4  This formal definition of the social system overlaps with an important special case of the standard model of 
general  equilibrium  with  pure  public  goods.  Partition  the  set  N  of  individuals  into  two  subsets:  the  “rich” 
{ } 1, ,m ¼  and the “poor” { } 1, , m n - ¼ , with  0 m n < < . Suppose that: any rich individual is indifferent to the 
other  rich  and  altruistic  to  the  poor,  that  is,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1   1   ,  , , i i i i m m n n w u x u x u x u x m + + = ¼   with  a  strictly 
increasing  i for all i m £ ; the poor are egoistic, that is,  ( ) ( ) ( ) i i i w u x u x =  for all i m > ; and the poor have null 
initial endowments, that is,  0 i w =  for all  i m > . Reinterpret, next, the private welfare of poor i as any generic 
pure public good of type i, private utility function ui as the production function of public good i, and private 
consumption xi as a vector of inputs of “private” commodities  {1,..., } h l Î .  We end up with the standard setup 
for a general equilibrium with public goods produced from private commodities, only distinguished from the 
most general version of the latter by  the assumption, embodied in the specification of individual social utility 
functions,  that  preference  relations  are  weakly  separable  with  respect  to  individual  consumption  of  private 
commodities. Note that this separability assumption is trivially verified when the private commodity is unique   5 
 
It will not be necessary, for the definite purposes of this article, to develop a fully explicit 
concept of social interactions, synthesized in a formal notion of social equilibrium, such as 
those of Debreu, 1952, Becker, 1974 or Mercier Ythier, 1993 or 1998ab for example (see 
Mercier Ythier, 2006: 3.1.1, 4.2.1 and 6.1.1 for a review of such notions). The following 
informal description, and set of partial definitions, will suffice.  
  Market  exchange  is  operated  by  individuals,  who  interact  “asympathetically” 
(Edgeworth,  1881)  or  “nontuistically”  (Wicksteed,  1913)  on  anonymous  markets,  through 
ophelimity-maximizing demands determined on the sole basis of market prices. 
  Sympathetic or altruistic interactions take place in redistribution. They may proceed, 
in  principle,  from  a  whole  range  of  moral  sentiments  of  individuals,  from  individual 
sentiments of affection between relatives, to individual moral sentiments of a more universal 
kind such as philanthropy or individual sense of distributive justice. They may, likewise, find 
their expression in a large variety of actions, from individual gift-giving to family transfers, 
charity  donations,  or  public  transfers.  We  concentrate,  in  this  article,  on  lump-sum 
redistribution which meets the (weak) unanimous agreement of the grand coalition, that is, 
redistribution of initial endowments that is approved by some individual members of society  
(one of them at least) and is disapproved by none. 
  These elements of social functioning are summarized in the formal definitions below, 
of  a  competitive  market  equilibrium,  and  a  distributive  liberal  social  contract.  They  are 
complemented by the two notions of Pareto efficiency naturally associated with them, that is, 
respectively,  the  Pareto-efficiency  relative  to  individual  private  utilities  (in  short,  market 
efficiency, or market optimum), and the Pareto-efficiency relative to individual social utilities 
(in short, distributive efficiency, or distributive optimum). 
 
Definition 1: A pair  ( , ) p x  such that  0 p ³  is a competitive market equilibrium (also called 
Walrasian equilibrium) with free disposal of the social system of private property ( ) , , w u w  if: 
(i)  x  is  attainable;  (ii)  (1 ) 0 h ih i N p x
Î - = ∑   for  all  h;  (iii)  and  xi  maximizes  ui  in 
{ :   }
l
i h ih h ih h L h L z p z p w + Î Î Î £ ∑ ∑ ℝ  for all i.  
 
Definition 2: An allocation x is a strong (resp. weak) market optimum of the social system 
( ) , , w u r   if  it  is  attainable  and  if  there  exists  no  attainable  allocation  x’  such  that 
( ) ( ’) i i i i u x u x ³  for all i, with a strict inequality for at least one i (resp.  ( ) ( ’) i i i i u x u x >  for all 
i). The set of weak (resp. strong) market optima of ( ) , , w u r  is denoted by Pu (resp. 
*
u u P P Ì ). 
 
Definition  3:  An  allocation  x  is  a  strong  (resp.  weak)  distributive  optimum  of  the  social 
system  ( ) , , w u r  if it is attainable and if there exists no attainable allocation x’ such that 
( ) ( ) ( ( ’)) i i w u x w u x ³   for  all  i,  with  a  strict  inequality  for  at  least  one  i  (resp. 
( ) ( ) ( ( ’)) i i w u x w u x >  for all i). The set of weak (resp. strong) distributive optima of ( ) , , w u r  
is denoted by Pw (resp. 
*
w w P P Ì ). 
 
Definition 4: Let  ( ) , p x  be a competitive market equilibrium with free disposal of the social 
                                                                                                                                                         
(l=1: this is the case considered in Mercier Ythier: 2006, 3.3.3 and 6, and in Conley, 1994).    6 
system of private property ( ) , , w u w . Pair  ( ) ( ) ’, ’, ’ p x w  is a distributive liberal social contract 
of  ( ) , , w u w   relative  to  market  equilibrium  ( ) , p x   if  ( ) ’, ’ p x   is  a  competitive  market 
equilibrium with free disposal of ( ) , , ’ w u w  such that: (i) x’ is a strong distributive optimum of 
( ) , , w u r ; (ii) and  ( ) ( ) ( ( ’)) i i w u x w u x ³  for all i. 
 
For the sake of brevity, the competitive market equilibrium with free disposal of Definition 1 
will often be referred to as Walrasian equilibrium or even simply as “market equilibrium” in 
the sequel. Likewise, we will often refer to the distributive liberal social contract simply as the 
“social contract”.  
Whenever  a  pair  ( ) ( ) ’, ’, ’ p x w   is  a  distributive  liberal  social  contract  of  ( ) , , w u w  
relative  to  market  equilibrium  ( ) , p x ,  we  also  refer  to  ω’  as  a  distributive  liberal  social 
contract  of  ( ) , , w u w   relative  to  ( ) , p x ,  and  to  x’  as  a  distributive  liberal  social  contract  
solution of ( ) , , w u w  relative to ( ) , p x . 
 
We  finally  introduce  two  assumptions  which  will  be  maintained  throughout  the  main 
propositions of the sequel.  
 
Assumption 1 below summarizes the working hypotheses of differentiability and convexity. 
Its contents, and notably  the second part of them, relative to distributive preferences,  are 
discussed  in  detail  in  Mercier  Ythier,  2009:  3.  The  definitions  of  corresponding  standard 
properties of utility functions, such as differentiability, quasi-concavity, strict quasi-concavity 
and other, are recalled in the associate footnote, with brief comments on their relations and on 




6:  Differentiable  convex  social  system:  (i)  For  all  i,  ui is:  (a)  continuous, 
                                                 
5  We use the following standard notations in the sequel. Let  ( ) 1, , m z z z = ¼  and  ( ) 1 ’ ’ , , ’
m
m z z z = ¼ Îℝ ,  1 m ³ : 
’ z z ³  if  ’ i i z z ³  for any i ;  ’ z z >  if  ’ z z ³  and    ’ z z ¹  ;    ’ z z ≫  if  ’ i i z z >  for any i ;  . ’ z z  is the inner product 
1 ’
m
i i i z z
= ∑ ;  z
T  is  the  transpose  (column-)  vector  of  z;  { : 0}
m m z z + + = Î ³ ℝ ℝ   ;  { : 0}
m m z z ++ + = Î ℝ ℝ ≫ .  Let 
( ) 1, , :
q
q f f f V = ¼ ® ℝ , defined on open set 
m V Ì ℝ , be the Cartesian product of the 
2 C  real-valued functions 
: i f V ® ℝ ;  f ¶  and  f
2 ¶  denote its first and second derivative respectively;  ) (x f ¶ , viewed in matrix form, is 
the  q m ´  (Jacobian) matrix whose generic entry  ) )( / ( x x f j i ¶ ¶ , also denoted by  ) (x fi j ¶  (or, sometimes, by 
) (x fi x j ¶ ), is the first partial derivative of fi with respect to its j-th argument at x; the transpose [ ] ( )
T
i f x ¶  of 
the i-th row of  ) (x f ¶  is the gradient vector of fi at x; finally,  ) (
2 x fi ¶ , viewed in matrix form, is the  m m ´  
(Hessian) matrix whose generic entries  ) )( / (
2 x x x f k j i ¶ ¶ ¶ , also denoted by  ) (
2 x fi jk ¶ , are the second partial 
derivatives of fi at x. 
6 Recall that ui is defined on 
l
+ ℝ , the nonnegative orthant of 
l ℝ . We say that such a function is increasing 
(resp.  strictly  increasing)  if  ’  i i x x ≫   (resp.  ’ i i x x > )  implies  ( ) ( ) ’ i i i i u x u x > .  It  is:  quasi-concave  if 
( ) ( ) ’ i i i i u x u x ³   implies  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ’ ’ i i i i i u x x u x a a + - ³   for    any    1 0 a ³ ³ ;    strictly      quasi-concave      if   
( ) ( )   ’ i i i i u x u x ³ ,        ’ i i x x ¹   implies    ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ’ ’ i i i i i u x x u x a a + - >  for any  1 0 a > > ; differentiably strictly 
quasi-concave in an open, convex set 
l V ++ Ì ℝ  if its restriction to V is 
2 C  (that is, twice differentiable with 
continuous second derivatives), strictly quasi-concave, and has a nonzero Gaussian curvature everywhere in V   7 
increasing, and unbounded above ; (b) 
2 C  in 
l
++ ℝ  ; (c) differentiably strictly quasi-concave in 
l
++ ℝ , and, in particular, differentiably strictly concave in an open, convex neighborhood of 
{ : }
l
i i x x r ++ Î £ ℝ  in  
l
++ ℝ ; (d) and such that  0 i x ≫  whenever  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 0 i i i u x u > = .(ii) For 




++ ℝ ; (c) quasi-
concave; (d) and such that  ( ) ( ) 0 i i w û w >  if and only if  0 û >> . (iii) For all i,  i w u    is quasi-
concave.  
 
The  second  assumption  is  the  differentiable  non-satiation  of  the  weak  distributive  
preordering of Pareto, which supposes, essentially, that distributive malevolence, if any, is 
not  so  intense  and/or  widespread  as  to  imply  the  depletion  of  aggregate  resources  at 
distributive  optimum.  Combined  with  Assumption  1,  it  implies  the  positive  aggregate 
valuation  of  the  private  wealth  and  welfare  of  all  individuals  at  distributive  optimum 
(Appendix: Theorem 3). That is, we suppose that malevolence, if any, is dominated, at social 
optimum,  by  positive  self-valuation,  possibly  combined  with  distributive  benevolence  (if 
any). 
 
Assumption  2:  Differentiable  non-satiation  of  the  weak  distributive  preordering  of 
Pareto: For all  n S mÎ  and all  ( )
n û u A ++ Î Çℝ ,  ( ) 0 i i i N w û m
Î ¶ ¹ ∑ . 
 
3- Selfishness in the marketplace, altruism in the society 
 
In this section, we briefly develop an interpretation of some of the key features of the formal 
                                                                                                                                                         
(or equivalently a  nonzero determinant of the bordered Hessian   
2 ( ) [ ( )]
( ) 0
T
i i i i
i i
u x u x
u x
  ¶ ¶
 
¶  
 for every xi in V); 
differentiably strictly concave in an open, convex set 
l V ++ Ì ℝ   if its restriction to V  is  and such that the 
Hessian matrix  ) (
2
i i x u ¶  is negative definite for every xi in V. Note that the differentiable strict quasi-concavity 
of ui in  
l
++ ℝ   implies the existence of a differentiably strictly concave 
2 C utility representation of the underlying 
preference preordering on any compact, convex subset of 
l
++ ℝ  (Mas-Colell, 1985: 2.6.4), so that the second part 
of assumption 1-(i)-(c) does not imply any additional restriction, relative to the first part of the same assumption. 
Note also that an increasing ui which also is differentiably strictly quasi-concave in 
l
++ ℝ  must be differentiably 
strictly increasing in 
l
++ ℝ , that is, such that  ( ) 0 i i u x ¶ ≫  everywhere in 
l
++ ℝ  (hence strictly increasing in 
l
++ ℝ ).  
And  note,  finally,  that  in  the  special  case  of  a  single  market  commodity  (that  is,  1 l = ),  we  can  let 
( ) ( ) Log 1 i i i u x x = +  without loss of generality (as “
2 C  differentiable strictly quasi-concave” degenerates, in 
this simple case, to “
2 C  strictly increasing”). 
Suppose, next, that utility representation ui is bounded above and verifies all other Assumptions 1-(i). 
Let  ( ) sup  ( )
l
i i u b a u r + = > > ℝ .  Note  that  [ ) ( ) 0,
l
i a u b + Î = ℝ ,  since  ui  is  continuous  and  increasing.  Define 
[ ) :   0,b x + ® ℝ  by:  ( ) t t x =  if  [ ) 0, t a Î  ; and  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
3
exp 1/ t t t a b t x = + - -  if  [ ) , t a b Î . One verifies by 
simple calculations that ξ is strictly increasing, and that  i u x    is 
2 C , unbounded above, and therefore represents 
the same preordering as ui and verifies assumption 1-(i). That is, there is no loss of generality in supposing ui 
unbounded above. 
Assumption  1-(i)  notably  implies  that  :
nl n u + + ® ℝ ℝ   is  onto  (since  ui  is  a  continuous,  increasing, 
unbounded above function  [ ) 0,
l
+ ® ¥ ℝ  for all i), so that the domain  ( )
nl u + ℝ  of individual distributive utility 
functions coincides with the nonnegative orthant of  
n ℝ . The definitions above extend readily to functions wi 
and  i w u   .    8 
model of section 2, in terms of their implications for individual’s market behaviour, social 
contract redistribution and their articulation. 
 
The  separability  of  individual  allocation  preferences  relative  to  own  consumption  means, 
essentially, that the individual behaviour of demand and supply of market commodities can be 
appropriately described by a stable Walrasian demand function, that is, a function: whose 
variables (the “determinants” of individual demand and supply) are restricted to market prices 
and  individual  wealth  (the  latter  reducing,  in  the  setup  above,  to  the  value  of  individual 
endowment  before  or  after  social  contract  redistribution);  and  which  is  homogeneous  of 
degree 0 in  these arguments (individuals are not subject to “monetary illusions”), additive 
(individuals spend their whole budget), and verifies the law of demand (the Slutsky matrix is 
symmetric semi-definite negative).
7 The stability of the demand function notably means, in 
this context, that individual demand behaviour is independent of others’ consumption. These 
assumptions can be suitably interpreted in terms of Wicksteed’s notion of nontuism referred 
to above, namely, the idea that individuals who indulge in market activities (purchases and 
sales of market commodities) concentrate on the latter, that is, temporarily ignore alternative 
considerations  which  they  might  find  interesting  in  another  context.  They  consistently 
maximize  stable  preferences  relative  to  this  narrowly  defined  object,  or,  equivalently, 
consistently  minimize  expenditure  relative  to  welfare  objectives  derived  from  such  stable 
preferences. 
 
Non-paternalistic  interdependent  utilities  consist,  next,  of  individual  preferences  over  the 
distribution of private welfare. Private welfare is determined by market prices and private 
wealth through individual (stable) consumption preferences and associate Walrasian demand, 
or,  equivalently,  through  individual  indirect  private  utility  functions  (see  the  precise 
formulation of these notions in section 4 below). The non-paternalistic allocation preferences 
of individuals therefore induce individual preferences over both market prices and wealth 
distribution
8,  combining  individual  distributive  utilities  with  indirect  private  utilities. 
Accordingly, the associate distributive optima can be characterized, equivalently: as feasible 
allocations  undominated  with  respect  to  individual  social  preferences;  or  as  price-wealth 
competitive equilibria (that is, systems of market prices and wealth distribution supporting 
market optima) undominated with respect to induced individual preferences over prices and 
wealth (Mercier Ythier, 2009: Theorem 3). The lump-sum endowment redistribution of the 
liberal  social  contract  therefore  affects  individual  conditions  of  optimization  through  two 
channels in this construct: its direct consequences over the distribution of wealth; and the 
substitution  and  income  effects  on  individual  demand  and  private  welfare  of  the  induced 
changes in equilibrium market prices. These effects of social contract redistribution involve 
two  types  of  externalities:  the  public  good  externalities  generated  by  the  changes  in  the 
distribution of wealth, whose extent is determined by the extent of actual distributive concerns 
in  society;  and  the  pecuniary  externalities  generated  by  induced  changes  in  equilibrium 
market prices (if any), which necessarily affect all individuals in society. If social contract 
redistribution, as should normally be expected, actually implies changes in equilibrium market 
prices,
9 wealth distribution then necessarily has the characters of a general (pure) public good 
                                                 
7 Standard microeconomic theory establishes the equivalence of maximizing consumption utility subject to linear 
budget  constraint,  minimizing  expenditure  subject  to  private  welfare  objectives,  behaving  according  to  a 
Walrasian  demand  function,  and  behaving  according  to  a  Hicksian  demand  function,  when  individual 
preferences are increasing differentiably strictly convex. 
8 This implies that we concentrate on the distribution aspects of the general notion of liberal social contract of 
Kolm, 1985. We abstract from alternative considerations, such as the treatment of consumption externalities, 
which are considered in the general notion (see, for example, Kolm, 2004, p. 67, on the latter subject). 
9  Theoretical  exceptions  are  well-known  and  quite  specific,  essentially:  invariance  of  aggregate  demand  to   9 
in this setup, if not directly through individual distributive concerns (as may or may not be the 
case, depending on the extent of the latter), at least indirectly through  induced pecuniary 
externalities. 
 
The condition of unanimous weak preference of social contract equilibrium allocation over 
initial equilibrium allocation (Definition 4-(ii)) implies an individual right of veto against any 
change in initial endowment distribution. This essential feature of the notion of distributive 
social contract developed here interprets as a social contract foundation for individual rights 
of  private  property,  understood  as  individuals’  shares  in  aggregate  social  resources  and 
subsequent individual right of freely allocating own share between the alternative uses of own 
consumption and market exchange.
10 In view of the ubiquitous externalities of social contract 
redistribution, it implies that sizeable  redistribution will take place within the distributive 
liberal social contract only if it receives a wide altruistic support in society (notwithstanding 
conceivable oddities and complexities briefly evoked in footnote 
11). Obvious circumstances 
where  such  altruistic  unanimous  agreement  can  be  reached  are  the  cases  of  individual 
starvation or social exclusion from extreme poverty. Parts (i)-(d) and (ii)-(d) of Assumption 1 
together imply unanimous strict preference for redistribution in situations where the private 
wealth or welfare of some individual(s) are null. Precisely, they imply that any allocation 
where  all  individuals  have  a  positive  private  wealth  and  welfare  is  unanimously  strictly 
preferred to any allocation where some individual’s private wealth is =0. 
 
The distributive liberal social contract, so construed, rationally founds a distributive welfare 
state,  by  providing  two  rationales  for  state  intervention  in  distribution  matters:  the 
enforcement of the individual rights of private  property constitutionally guaranteed in the 
social contract; and the solution of the social efficiency issues raised by the public good and 
                                                                                                                                                         
redistribution (Bergstrom and Cornes, 1983 and Bergstrom and Varian, 1985); and, in the case of Walrasian 
production economies, constant returns to scale in firms’ production of market commodities. 
10  The  opportunity  of  including  redistributive  gift-giving,  whether  individual  or  collective,  in  this  list  of 
alternative uses of private wealth is open to future research. Presumably, private redistributive gift-giving should 
be crowded out by unanimous social contract redistribution in the multi-commodity setup, as it is in the single-
commodity setup, and under essentially the same conditions (Mercier Ythier, 1998: Theorem 1). 
11 Logically (if not practically) interesting cases of complex redistribution patterns are the so-called “transfer 
paradoxes”, where, for example, a “donor” transferring (or depleting) part of his endowment ends up better off in 
terms  of  his  private  welfare,  and/or  a  “beneficiary”  of  transfers  ends  up  worse  off  relative  to  this  welfare 
criterion, as in the cases of impoverishing transfers discussed in international trade theory. In such cases, the 
“true” donors are, of course, those whose private welfare diminishes in transfers.  
The unanimous agreement condition for liberal social contract redistribution implies that all individuals, 
and notably “true donors”, should end up better off in terms of their individual social welfare following the 
transfers (“paradoxical” or not). That is, true donors should be compensated for their loss in private welfare by 
some satisfaction from their distributive preferences. It is logically conceivable (if not psychologically plausible) 
that  part  of  such  compensations  be  derived  from  the  satisfaction  of  distributive  malevolence,  “true  donor” 
enjoying the loss in private welfare of other true donors whom she or he dislikes. One of our basic assumptions 
(Assumption 2), while compatible with such psychological complexities at individual level, rules them out as 
possible driving force of redistribution at social contract level, by supposing, essentially, that self appreciation 
and altruism together dominate malevolence. That is, social contract redistribution, if any, necessarily proceeds 
from dominant distributive altruism among true donors in this setup, as asserted in the text above. To put it more 
formally,  it  can  be  easily  shown,  under  Assumptions  1  and  2,  that  if  individuals  are  non-benevolent  the 
distributive  liberal  social  contract  necessarily  reduces  to  status  quo  (hint  of  proof:  Suppose  that  a  market 
optimum  x  is  not  a  distributive  optimum,  and  consider  a  coalition  of  malevolent  true  donors  at  x;  their 
distributive utilities are jointly decreasing in their private welfare at x, jointly increasing in their private welfare 
at 0, and must therefore attain a point of satiation of associate partial preordering at some accessible allocation in 
A, which contradicts Assumption 2). Naturally, non-benevolence includes distributive indifference as a special 
case, that is, the distributive liberal social contract is the status quo, and therefore, in particular, rules out transfer 
paradoxes, in Arrow-Debreu social systems (see Example 3 of subsection 5.2 below).   10 
pecuniary externalities of collective redistribution. The same rational foundations extend to 
the  productive  public  sector  (the  productive  welfare  state,  so  to  speak),  through  the 
reinterpretation of transfers and individual motives outlined in footnote 
4. 
 
4- The distribution of wealth and welfare as public goods 
 
This section draws the consequences of the public good characteristics of the distribution of 
ophelimity or wealth (Kolm, 1966, Hochman and Rodgers, 1969), in terms of the latter’s 
valuation by suitably defined supporting prices at distributive optimum.  
 
We denote by vi the indirect (private) utility function of an individual i in the sequel. It is 
defined  in  the  usual  way,  as  the  function 
l
++ + ´ ® ℝ ℝ ℝ   such  that 
( ) ( ) { } , max : 0 and  . i i i i i i i v p r u x x p x r = ³ £   for  any  price-wealth  vector  ( ) ,
l
i p r ++ + Î ´ ℝ ℝ . 
Under Assumption 1-(i), indirect private utility functions are: >0 and 
1 C  over 
l
++ ++ ´ ℝ ℝ ; 
well-defined  and  continuous  over 
l
++ + ´ ℝ ℝ ,  with  ( ) ,0 0 i v p =   for  all  0 p ≫ ;  strictly 
increasing  with  respect  to  wealth;  and  positively  homogeneous  of  degree  0.  We  let:  the 
distribution  of  money  wealth  ( ) 1, , n r r ¼   be  denoted  by  r;  the  product  function 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 , , , ,  , n n p r v p r v p r ® ¼  be denoted by v. 
 
We  first  recall  the  definition  of  a  market  price  equilibrium,  and  then  proceed  to  the 
construction, on an analogous pattern, of a notion of social contract price equilibrium.  
 
Definition  5:  Attainable  allocation  x  is  a  market  price  equilibrium  with  free  disposal  of 
( ) , , w u r  if there exists a vector of market prices  0 p ³  such that   .( ) 0 i i N p x r
Î - = ∑  and xi 
maximizes ui in  { :   .   . }
l
i i i z p z p x + Î £ ℝ  for all i. 
 
Under  Assumption  1-(i),  market  price  equilibrium  is  equivalent  to  market  optimum,  as  a 
consequence of the first and second theorems of welfare economics.  
 
The Theorem 2 of Mercier Ythier, 2009, reproduced in Theorem 3 of the Appendix of the 
present  article,  states  that,  under  Assumptions  1  and  2,  the  weak  distributive  optima  of 
( ) , , w u r   can  be  identified  with  the  maxima  of  ( ) i i i N w u m
Î ∑     in  the  set  of  attainable 
allocations  { : }
nl
i i N A x x r + Î = Î £ ∑ ℝ , the vector of weights  m  running over the unit-simplex 
Sn. This fact yields the following definition of a supported distributive optimum: 
 
Definition 6: A weak distributive optimum x of  ( ) , , w u r  is supported by vector  0 m ¹  of  
n
+ ℝ  if x maximizes  ( ) i i i N w u m
Î ∑    in the set of attainable allocations of the social system. 
 
The maxima of the “social-social” welfare functions  ( ) i i i N w u m
Î ∑    with strictly positive 
weights are of special interest from a normative perspective, as they take into account, to 
some extent at least, the distributive preferences of all individuals. For this reason, we label 
them inclusive distributive optima below, defined formally as follows: 
 
Definition 7: A weak distributive optimum is inclusive if it is supported by a  0 ≫  vector m .   11 
 
Supported distributive optima are identical to weak distributive optima by Theorem 3. The set 
of inclusive distributive optima is contained in the set of strong distributive optima as an 
immediate  consequence  of  definitions.  The  latter  inclusion  is  proper  in  general  (see  the 
remark following Theorem 2 in section 5 below). We denote by 
* *
w P  the set of inclusive 
distributive optima. We therefore have w w w P P P Ì Ì
* * * , with generally proper inclusions. 
 
We know from Theorem 3 that any weak distributive optimum is supported by a strictly 
positive vector of market prices. A pair ( ) ,
n l p m + ++ Î ´ ℝ ℝ  (with  0 m ¹ ) supporting any weak 
distributive optimum x is defined up to a positive multiplicative constant by the first-order 
conditions of Theorem 3-(ii), and therefore can be chosen so that either  n S mÎ  or  l p S Î  (but 
not both, except by coincidence). Note that  m  need not be unique, in general, for a given p, 
while  p  necessarily  is  unique  for  any  given  m .  If  i m   is  0 > ,  the  term 
( ) ( ) ( , . )
j i j i r j j w u x v p p x m¶ ¶  of the first-order conditions interprets as the marginal valuation, 
by individual i, of individual j’s wealth. The sum  ( ) ( ) ( , . )
j i j i r j j i N w u x v p p x m
Î ¶ ¶ ∑  is the 
“social-social” marginal valuation of j’s wealth at the distributive optimum. It is constant (=1) 
over j. The distinction of an “individual-social” and a “social-social” marginal valuation of 
individual wealth is a consequence of the public good character of wealth distribution in this 
setup. The f.o.c.  ( ) ( ) ( , . ) 1
j i j i r j j i N w u x v p p x m
Î ¶ ¶ = ∑  derived in Theorem 3 correspond, in 




“Social-social” marginal valuations of individual ophelimities are well-defined at any weak 
distributive optimum, while a complete system of individual marginal valuations of his and 
others’ ophelimities is well-defined only for inclusive distributive optima (as the definition of 
a meaningful system of marginal valuations of any individual i supposes a positive supporting 
i m ). These facts, and the normative reason for a special consideration of inclusive distributive 
optima, justify the introduction of the two additional notions below, which emphasize the 
inclusive outcomes of social contract redistribution. 
Let  ij p   denote  i’s  marginal  valuation  of  j’s  wealth,  corresponding,  in  the  former 
paragraph, to a term of the type  ( ) ( ) ( , . )
j i j i r j j w u x v p p x m¶ ¶ . This corresponds to i’s Lindahl 
price of j’s wealth, in a scheme of Lindahl pricing of wealth distribution as a public good. 
Note that  ii p  necessarily is positive at inclusive distributive optimum under Assumption 1, 
but that  ij p  could be negative (resp. =0) for a pair of distinct individuals i and j, if (and only 
if) i is malevolent (resp. indifferent) to j at this optimum that is, if  ( ) ( ) 0 j i w u x ¶ <  (resp. =0). 
We  let  ( ) 1, , i i in p p p = ¼   and  ( ) 1, , n p p p = ¼   in  the  sequel.  We  then  define  an  inclusive 
distributive liberal social contract, and a social contract price equilibrium as follows:   
 
Definition 8: Pair  ( ) ( ’, ’, ’ ) p x w  is an inclusive distributive liberal social contract of ( ) , , w u w , 
                                                 
12  The  f.o.c.  ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ) i j i j j i N w u x u x p m
Î ¶ ¶ = ∑   of  Theorem  3-(ii)  formally  correspond,  likewise,  to  Bowen-
Lindahl-Samuelson conditions for “public good” xj. For a detailed comment of the paradoxes associated with the 
formal identification of private wealth with a public good, see Mercier Ythier, 2006: 6, notably pp. 296-300.     12 
relative to competitive market equilibrium with free disposal ( ) , p x  of ( ) , , w u w , if ( ) ’, ’ p x  is 
a  competitive  market  equilibrium  with  free  disposal    of  ( ) , , ’ w u w   such  that:  (i) 
( ) ( ) ( ( ’)) w u x w u x ³ ; (ii) and x’ is an inclusive distributive optimum of ( ) , , w u r . 
 
Definition 9: Market price equilibrium x’ of ( ) , , w u r  is a social contract price equilibrium of 
( ) , , w u w , relative to competitive market equilibrium with free disposal ( ) , p x  of ( ) , , w u w , if: 
(i)  ( ) ( ) ( ( ’)) w u x w u x ³ ; (ii) there exists ( ) ’, p p  such that: (a) p’ supports x’; (b) 1 ij i Np
Î = ∑  
for  all  j;  (c)  and,  for  all  i,    ( ) 1 ’ ’. ’, , ’. ’ n r p x p x = ¼   maximizes  ( ) ( ) ’, i r w v p r ®   in 
{ : . . ’}
n
i i r r r p p + Î £ ℝ .  
 
The next theorem establishes the connections between these last two notions, and shows, as a 
by-product, that the set of ( 0 ≫ ) social contract price equilibria of a social system of private 
property, relative to a Walrasian equilibrium x of the latter, is the set of inclusive distributive 
optima unanimously weakly preferred to x.  
 
Theorem 1: Let  ( ) , , w u r  verify Assumptions 1 and 2, and suppose moreover that for all 
0 p ≫   and  all  i N Î ,  function  ( ) ( ) , i r w v p r ®   is  quasi-concave  in 
l
++ ℝ .  The  following 
propositions (i) and (ii) are then equivalent: (i) Allocation 
* * x w = is a  0 ≫  social contract 
price equilibrium of  ( ) , , w u w , relative to competitive market equilibrium with free disposal 
( )
0 0 , p x   of  ( ) , , w u w ;  (ii)  Endowment  distribution 
* * x w = is,  both:  (a)  an  inclusive 
distributive optimum of  ( ) , , w u r ; (b) and an inclusive distributive liberal social contract of 
( ) , , w u w , relative to competitive market equilibrium with free disposal ( )
0 0 , p x  of ( ) , , w u w . 
In particular, the set of  0 ≫  social contract price equilibria of ( ) , , w u w  relative to ( )
0 0 , p x  is 
equal to  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
** 0 { : } w x P w u x w u x Î ³ . 
 
Proof: The last part of Theorem 1 is a simple consequence of the first part and Definition 8. 
Let us prove the first part, that is, (i)Û (ii). 
(i) We first prove that (i)⇒(ii). Let x
* be a >>0 social contract price equilibrium relative to 
competitive market equilibrium with free disposal ( )
0 0 , p x  of ( ) , , w u w . Then 
* x  is a market 
price equilibrium by Definition 9. It is supported by a  0 ≫  system of market prices 
* p , hence 
such  that  i i N x r
Î = ∑ .  Since 
* x   is  0 ≫ ,  we  have 
* * * * * ) . , ( ) ( p x p p v x u i i r i i i ¶ = ¶   for  all  i. 
Moreover, for all i there exists  i n ++ Îℝ  such that 
* * * * ( ( , )) ( , )
j j i r j j i ij w v p r v p r n p ¶ ¶ =  for all 
j N Î ,  by  the  first-order  conditions  for  a  0 ≫   maximum  of  ( ) ( )
*   , i r w v p r ®   in  
* { :  . . }
n
i i r r r p p ++ Î £ ℝ  (where  ( )
* * * * *
1 . , , . n r p x p x = ¼ ). Dividing both sides of the f.o.c. by  i n , 
adding up over i for any given j, and using the fact that  1 ij i Np
Î = ∑  by Definition 9, one gets 
the set of Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson conditions:  ( )
* * * * 1/ ( ( , )) ( , ) 1
j i j i r j j i N w v p r v p r n
Î ¶ ¶ = ∑  
for all j. Letting  ( ) 1 1/ , ,1/ n m n n = ¼ , and combining the findings above, we end up with the   13 
following: 
* x  is  0 ≫ , such that 
*
i i N x r
Î = ∑ , and there exists ( )
* ,
n l p m ++ ++ Î ´ ℝ ℝ  such that, 
for  all  j N Î ,  ( ) ( )
* 0 i j i i N w u x m
Î ¶ > ∑   and  ( ) ( ) ( )
* * *
i j i j j i N w u x u x p m
Î ¶ ¶ = ∑ .  The 
conclusion follows from Theorem 3 with a suitable normalization of m . 
(ii) We now prove the converse (ii)⇒(i). Let endowment distribution 
* w  be an inclusive 
distributive  optimum  of  ( ) , , w u r   and  an  inclusive  distributive  liberal  social  contract  of 
( ) , , w u w  relative to competitive market equilibrium with free disposal  ( )
0 0 , p x  of  ( ) , , w u w . 
From Theorem 3 and the definition of an inclusive distributive optimum: 
* w  is  0 ≫ , such that 
*
i i Nw r
Î = ∑ ,  and  there  exists  a 
n m ++ Îℝ   and  a  unique 
*
l p S Î   such  that,  for  all  j N Î , 
( ) ( )
* 0 i j i i N w u m w
Î ¶ > ∑   and  ( ) ( ) ( )
* * *
i j i j j i N w u u p m w w
Î ¶ ¶ = ∑ .  We  know  that, 
consequently: 
* w  is a market price equilibrium with free disposal of  ( ) , , w u r , supported by 
* p , and that  ( ) ( )
* * * * ( , . ) 1/
j r j j i j i i N v p p w u w m w
Î ¶ = ¶ ∑  for all j. Let:  ( )
* * * * *
1 . , ,  . n r p p w w = ¼ ; 
* * * *   ( ( , )) ( , )
j ij i j i r j j w v p r v p r p m = ¶ ¶  for all (i,j). Then  1 ij i Np
Î = ∑  for all j. And for all (i,j): 
( )
* * * * ( ( , )) ( , ) 1/
j j i r j j i ij w v p r v p r m p ¶ ¶ = , with 1/ 0 i m > .  
  At this stage, we have proved that: there exists a system of market prices 
* 0 p ≫  
which supports 
* w
 as a market price equilibrium of ( ) , , w u r , and a system of Lindahl prices 
p  such that: 
* * * *   ( ( , )) ( , )
j ij i j i r j j w v p r v p r p m = ¶ ¶  for all (i,j);  1 ij i Np
Î = ∑  for all j; and, for all 
i,  
* r  verifies the first-order necessary conditions for a local maximum of  ( ) ( )
*   , i r w v p r ®  in 
* { : . . }
n
i i r r r p p + Î £ ℝ . There remains to establish that:  ( ) ( )
* 0 ( ( )) i i w u w u x w ³  for all i; and  
* r  is a global maximum of  ( ) ( )
*   , i r w v p r ®  in 
* { : . . }
n
i i r r r p p + Î £ ℝ  for all i. 
  Endowment distribution 
* w  being a market price equilibrium of ( ) , , w u r  necessarily 
is the unique Walrasian equilibrium allocation of ( )
* , , w u w  under Assumption 1-(i) (Balasko, 
1988: 3.4.4)
13. The definition of a liberal distributive social contract then readily implies that 
( ) ( )
* 0 ( ( )) i i w u w u x w ³  for all i. 
Finally, the functions  ( ) ( )
*   , i r w v p r ®  being quasi-concave in 
n
++ ℝ  by assumption, 
the  first-order  necessary  conditions  for  a  local  maximum  of  ( ) ( )
*   , i r w v p r ®   in 
* { : . . }
n
i i r r r p p + Î £ ℝ   are  also  sufficient  conditions  for  a  global  maximum  of  the  same 
program, as a consequence of the Theorem 1 of Arrow and Enthoven, 1961.■  
 
The assumption that  functions  ( ) ( )   , i r w v p r ®  are quasi-concave in 
n
++ ℝ
 does not imply 
significant additional restrictions on individual preferences, relative to the quasi-concavity of 
distributive utility functions wi, as established in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: Suppose that  ( ) , w u  verifies Assumption 1, and let  ( ) ij D û  (resp.  ( ) ’ ij D r ) 
                                                 
13 See the Appendix of Mercier Ythier, 2007 for a discussion of the relations between our Assumption 1 and 
Balasko’s setup, and associate conditions for a valid transposition of Balasko’s results into our setup.     14 
denote  the  j-th  principal  minor  of  the  bordered  Hessian  of  wi  (resp.  ( ) ( )   , i r w v p r ® ), 
evaluated  at  0 û ≫   (resp.  0 r ≫ ).  Then:  ( ) ( ) ( )
2 ’ ( ( , )) ,
k ij r k k ij k j D r v p r D v p r
£ = ¶ Õ )  for  all 
( ) , 0 p r ≫ , and all i and j. In particular, for all i: (i) principal minors  ( ) ’ ij D r  verify the 
necessary  condition  for  the  quasi-concavity  of  ( ) ( )   , i r w v p r ®   in 
n
++ ℝ ;  (ii)  if  principal 
minors  ( ) ij D û   verify  the  sufficient  condition  for  the  quasi-concavity  of  wi  in 
n
++ ℝ ,  then 
( ) ( )   , i r w v p r ®  is quasi-concave in 
n
++ ℝ . 
 
Proof:  The  bordered  Hessian  of  ( ) i û w û ® ,  evaluated  at  0 û ≫ ,  is  matrix 
( )






w û w û
H û
w û
  ¶ ¶
=  
¶  
.  The  bordered  Hessian  of  ( ) ( )   , i r w v p r ® ,  evaluated  at 
0 r ≫ ,  is  matrix  ( )
2( )( , ) [ ( )( , )]
’





w v p r w v p r
H r
w v p r
  ¶ ¶
=  
¶  
   
 
.  The  generic  entry  of 
) , )( (
2 r p v wi   ¶   which  is  located  on  the  j-th  row  and  k-th  column  of  ( ) ’ i H r   is 
) , ( ) , ( )) , ( (
2
k k r j j r i jk r p v r p v r p v w
k j ¶ ¶ ¶ .  The  generic  entry  of  ) , )( ( r p v wi   ¶   (resp. 
T
i r p v w )] , )( ( [   ¶ ) which is located on the k-th column (resp. j-th row) of  ( ) ’ i H r , with k n £  
(resp.  j n £ ), is  ) , ( )) , ( ( k k r i k r p v r p v w
k ¶ ¶  (resp.  ) , ( )) , ( ( j j r i j r p v r p v w
j ¶ ¶ ). The multilinearity 
of  the  determinant  then  implies:  ( ) ( ) ( )
2 ’ ( ( , )) ,
k ij r k k ij k j D r v p r D v p r
£ = ¶ Õ .  The  marginal 
ophelimities of wealth  ) , ( k k r r p v
k ¶  being  0 >  for all k,  ( ) ’ ij D r  is equal to 0 if and only if 
( ) ( ) , 0 ij D v p r = , and otherwise has the same sign as  ( ) ( ) , j D v p r . The second part of the 
proposition  is  a  simple  consequence  of  these  facts  and  of  the  Theorem  3  of  Arrow  and 
Enthoven, 1961.■ 
 
Note, to conclude this section, that the concept of social contract price equilibrium introduced 
above endorses the separation of allocation and distribution as autonomous processes. There 
is not, and actually there cannot be, in this setup, any price system that would simultaneously 
coordinate the allocation and distribution choices of individuals. The reason for this is quite 
simple indeed, embodied in the basic structure of the construct: for any given endowment 
distribution, the systems of equilibrium market prices are entirely determined by individual 
private  preferences,  through  the  aggregate  excess  demand  function  that  the  latter  induce. 
Symmetrically, the coordination of redistributive transfers by means of Lindahl prices, if any, 
must be made on the basis of given market prices. We develop an equilibrium concept of this 
type in section 6.  
 
5- Global properties of regular distributive efficiency 
 
This section characterizes the global structure of the sets of inclusive distributive optima and 
social contract price equilibria, which stems from the characterization of inclusive distributive 
optima  as  maxima  of  positively  weighted  sums  of  individual  social  utilities  in  the  set  of 
attainable allocations. We first elicit, in subsection 5.1, the regularity conditions on the system 
of individual social preferences ensuring that the sets of inclusive distributive optima and of 
social contract price equilibria are well-behaved in terms of dimension and connectedness.   15 
This general property is complemented, in subsection 5.2, with the presentation of examples 
of social systems where the social contract solution appears degenerate, for reasons rooted in 
their  basic  structure,  that  is,  in  the  initial  endowment  distribution  or  in  the  system  of 
individual  social  preferences.  Subsection  5.3,  finally,  provides  insights  on  the  type  of 
restrictions on individual social preferences required to obtain a well-behaved social contract 
solution.  
 
5.1- Regular distributive efficiency 
 
In  this  subsection,  we  notably  concentrate  on  correspondence  : n S A j ®   defined  by: 
( ) ( ) ( )  argmax{ : } i i i N w u x x A j m m
Î = Î ∑ .  The  correspondence  is  well-defined,  and  its 
values  are  contained  in  w P ,  when  the  social  system  verifies  Assumption  1  and  the 
differentiable nonsatiation of the weak distributive preordering of Pareto (Theorem 3).We 
summarize some of its elementary properties in the next proposition: 
 
Proposition  2:  Let  ( ) , , w u r   verify  Assumptions  1  and  2.  Then:  w P   is  a  nonempty  and 
compact subset of A; and j  is a well-defined, upper hemi-continuous, compact- and convex-
valued correspondence  n w S P ® . 
 
Proof:  The  continuity  of  functions  ( ) i i i N w u m
Î ∑     for  all  n S mÎ   and  compactness  of  A 
readily  implies  that  j   is  well-defined,  that  is,  that  ( ) ( ) argmax{ : } i i i N w u x x A m
Î Î ∑   is  a 
nonempty  subset  of  A  for  all  n S mÎ .  The  convex-valuedness  of  j   is  a  straightforward 
consequence  of  the  convexity  of  set  A  and  quasi-concavity  of  functions  i w u     for  all  i. 
( )
n w S P m j m Î = È   by  Theorem  3.  It  will  suffice,  therefore,  to  finish  with,  to  establish  that 
Graph j  is closed (see Mas-Colell, 1985: A.6). Let  ( ) ,
q q x m  be a converging sequence of 
elements of Graph j , and denote by ( ) ,x m  its limit. We want to prove that  ( ) x m j = . From 
Theorem 3 and the continuity of functions  i w ¶ ,  i u   and  i u ¶  for all i: x is  0 ³ , such that 
i i N x r
Î = ∑ ,  and  there  exists 
l p + Îℝ   such  that,  for  all  ( ) , i j N N Î ´ , 
( ) ( ) ( ) i j i j j i N w u x u x p m
Î ¶ ¶ = ∑ .  m  belongs to  n S  by closedness of the latter, so that  0 m > . 
Therefore, x verifies the first-order necessary conditions for a weak maximum of w in A. The 
f.o.c. are also sufficient, by Assumption 1 and the Theorem 1 of Arrow and Enthoven, 1961. 
Therefore  w x P Î , and the conclusion then comes as a simple consequence of Theorem 3.■ 
 
Correspondence  j  will be viewed, consequently, as a correspondence  n w S P ®  from there 
on. Let  Int  n S  denote the relative interior of   ( )
n
n n S S ++ = Çℝ . The restriction of j  to  Int  n S  
appears as a natural candidate for a homeomorphism 
** Int  n w S P ® ,  provided  notably  that  
( ) j m  and  ( )
1 x j
-  be single-valued for all  Int  n S mÎ  and all 
**
w x P Î . This need not hold true 
in  general.  The  following  notion  of  regular  distributive  efficiency  sets  minimal  sufficient 
conditions for j  to define such a homeomorphism. 
 
Definition  10:  The  differentiable  social  system  ( ) , , w u r   is  regular  with  respect  to   16 
distributive efficiency if: (i)  )) ( ( x u w ¶  is nonsingular for all 
**
w x P Î ; (ii) and  ( ) i i i N w u m
Î ∑    is 
differentiably strictly concave at all  ( ) x j m Î  for all  Int  n S mÎ . 
 
We  show  in  Theorem  2  below  that  the  second  regularity  condition  (differentiable  strict 
concavity) is sufficient for  ( ) j m  to be single-valued for all  Int  n S mÎ , and that the first 
regularity condition of Definition 10 (nonsingularity) is sufficient for  ( )
1 x j
-  to be single-
valued for all  
**
w x P Î .  
The  manifold  structure  of  the  set  of  inclusive  distributive  optima  of  differentiable 
social systems, and of the set of social contract price equilibria of differentiable social systems 
of private property, then follows from the first regularity condition by means of the Regular 
Value Theorem.  
 
Theorem  2:  (i)  Let  ( ) , , w u r   verify  Assumptions  1  and  2,  and  suppose  that  ( ) , , w u r   is 
regular with respect to distributive efficiency. Then 
* *
w P  is a simply connected C
1 manifold of 
dimension  1 n - ,  homeomorphic  to  Int  n S .  (ii)  Suppose  moreover  that  functions 
( ) ( ) , i r w v p r ®  are quasi-concave in  
n
++ ℝ  for all  0 p ≫  and all i N Î . Then, for any initial 
distribution  A wÎ   and  any  competitive  market  equilibrium  with  free  disposal  ( ) , p x   of 
( ) , , w u w  such that  w x P Ï , the relative interior of the set of social contract price equilibria of 
( ) , , w u w  relative to  ( ) , p x  is a simply connected C
1 manifold of dimension  1 n - , whose 
inverse image by j  is a simply connected, open subset of Int  n S . 
 
Proof:  The proof proceeds in three steps. 
(i) In Step 1, we prove that: The restriction of j  to Int  n S  is a homeomorphism 
** Int  n w S P ®  
with a C
1 inverse; in particular,
* *
w P  is simply connected. 
We first prove that the second regularity condition implies that  ( ) j m  is single-valued for all 
Int  n S mÎ . Let  Int  n S mÎ . We suppose that  ( ) j m  contains two distinct elements x and x’, 
and derive a contradiction. The definition of j  and the quasi-concavity of functions  i w u    
together  imply  that  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ’ ’ w u x x w u x w u x a a + - ³ =   for  all  real  number 
[ ] 0,1 a Î . The second regularity condition readily implies that the C
2 functions  i w u    are all 
strictly concave in some neighbourhood U of x in  
nl ℝ . For  1 a <  sufficiently close to 1, we 
must therefore have  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ’ w u x x w u x a a + - ≫ .  But  ( ) 1 ’ x x A a a + - Î , due to the 
convexity of the latter set. Therefore  ( ) x j m Ï , the wished contradiction. 
We next prove that, for any 
**
w x P Î ,  ( )
1 x j
-  is single-valued and C
1.  
From Theorem 3: 
**
w x P Î   is a  0 ≫  market price equilibrium supported by a  0 ≫  
price system p which is unique up to a positive multiplicative constant. Let 
* p  denote the 
unique  supporting  price  system of x that  belongs  to  Sl. Theorem  5 implies that for any     
( )
1 x m j
- Î  there exists a unique price system 
* p a , proportional to 
* p  with a ++ Îℝ , such 
that, for all  j N Î ,  ( ) ( ) ( )
* * 1/ , .
j i j i r j j i N w u x v p p x m a a
Î ¶ = ¶ ∑ .    17 
The  homogeneity  of  degree  0  of  indirect  ophelimity  functions  imply  that 
( ) ( ) ( )
* * * * , . 1/   , .
j j r j j r j j v p p x v p p x ba ba b a a ¶ = ¶   for  all  0 b >   (positive  homogeneity  of 
degree  1 -   of  the  derivative).  Letting  ( )
1
* *




1 1 1 1 ( ) , . r u x v p p x p a a a ¶ = ¶ ,  one  gets:  ( ) ( )
1
* * * *
1 1 , . /   , .
j r j j r v p p x v p p x a a a a ¶ ¶ = 
) ). ( ), ( ( 1 1 1 1 j j r x x u x u v
j ¶ ¶ ¶  for all  1 j > .  
Dividing f.o.c. ∑ ÎN i  i∂jwi(u(x))=1/ j r v
j ¶ (αp
*,αp
*.xj) by f.o.c.  ∑ ÎN i  i∂1wi(u(x))= 
1/ 1 1v r ¶ (αp
*,αp
*.x1)  for  all  j>1,  and  using  the  result  of  the  former  paragraph,  one  gets  the 
following  equivalent  system  of  n-1  equations:    (1/∑ ÎN i  i∂1wi(u(x)))∑ ÎN i  i∂jwi(u(x))= 
1/ ) ). ( ), ( ( 1 1 1 1 j j r x x u x u v
j ¶ ¶ ¶ . Multiplying both sides by  ∑ ÎN i  i∂1wi(u(x)) and rearranging, 
one finally gets: ∑ ÎN i  i(∂jwi(u(x))-(1/ ) ). ( ), ( ( 1 1 1 1 j j r x x u x u v
j ¶ ¶ ¶ )∂1wi(u(x)))=0, j>1.  
Denote  by  ( ) B x   the  n n ´   matrix  obtained  from  Jacobian  matrix  ( ) ( ) w u x ¶   by 
substracting  column-vector  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 1/ ( ( ), ( ). )
j r j j v u x u x x w u x ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶   to  the  first  and  j-th 
columns of  ( ) ( ) w u x ¶  for all  1 j > , and by  ( ) C x  the  ( 1) n n ´ -  matrix obtained from  ( ) B x  
by deleting its first column. The system of f.o.c. obtained at the end of the former paragraph 
writes, in matrix form:  ( ) . 0 C x m = , or equivalently  ( ) . 0
T T C x m =     , which, for any given x,  
characterizes the kernel  of the transpose of  ( ) C x . The first regularity condition of Definition 
10  and  the  multilinearity   of   the   determinant   imply    ( ( )) ( ) 0 w u x B x ¶ = ¹ ,   hence  
rank  ( ) ( ) rank 1
T
C x C x n = = -     .  Therefore  ( ) ( ) dim Kernel  1 1
T
C x n n = - - =     ,  that  is, 
the kernel of  ( )
T
C x      is  a   homogeneous   line   of   
n ℝ ,   which  moreover  admits  a   0 >   
directing    vector    since    ( ) ( )
1 Kernel 
T
x C x j
- Ì     .  Its  intersection  with  hyperplane 
{ : 0}
n
i i N z z
Î Î = ∑ ℝ  reduces, consequently, to { } 0 . This implies in turn that the n n ´  matrix 
( ) D x   obtained  from  ( ) B x   by  substituting  the  transpose  of  the  unit  diagonal  row-vector 
( ) 1, ,1 ¼   of 
n ℝ   for  its  first  column  is  nonsingular,  for:  ( ) ( )
 
rank  rank 
T
D x D x = =      
( ) ( ) dim Kernel   dim { : 0} Kernel   
T T n
i i N n D x n z z C x n
Î - = - Î = Ç =         ∑ ℝ . Therefore 
equation  ( ) ( ) . 1,0, ,0 0 D x m - ¼ = , viewed as a linear equation in  m  for any fixed 
**
w x P Î , 
admits a unique solution,  ( ) ( )
1
1,0, ,0 . D x
-
= ¼     . We can let  ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1,0, ,0 . x D x j
- - = ¼     .  
Moreover, 
1 j
-  is C
1 by Assumptions 1-(i)-(b) and 1-(ii)-(b) (C
2 utility functions) and the 
implicit function theorem applied to function  ( ) ( ) ( ) :   , . 1,0, ,0
n nl n x D x m m ++ ´ ® ® - ¼ ℝ ℝ ℝ  
at any point ( )
** , n w x S P m Î ´   such that  ( )
1 x m j
- Î . 
From there on, the restriction of j  to Int  n S  is denoted by  ’ j . 
Theorem  3  and  the  definition  of  inclusive  distributive  optimum  readily  imply  that 
( )
** Int  n w S P j = .  Function   ’ j  therefore is a one-to-one mapping 
** Int  n w S P ®  with a C
1 
inverse. We now prove that  ’ j  is continuous. Let sequence 
q m  converge to  m  in Int  n S . The   18 
compactness of A implies that sequence  ( ) ’
q j m  admits a converging subsequence in A. Let x 
be the latter’s limit. The continuity of  ( ) ( ) ( ) , i i i N x w u x m m
Î ®∑  implies that inequalities 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )   ’  
q q q
i i i i i N i N w u w u z m j m m
Î Î ³ ∑ ∑ , which hold true for all pairs  ( ) ( ) , ’
q q m j m  and 
all z A Î  by definition of  ’ j , extend to the limit pair ( ) ,x m . That is,  ( ) ’ x j m = .  
Finally,  Int  n S  is simply connected, as a convex set. Therefore, ( )
**   ’ Int  w n P S j =  is 
simply connected, as homeomorphic to the former. This completes the proof of the first step. 
(ii) In Step 2, we prove that:
* *
w P  is a C
1 manifold of dimension  1 n - . 
Let g denote the 
1 C  function  Int 
n n
u P ++ ´ ® ℝ ℝ  defined by  ( ) ( ) ( ) ,   . 1,0, ,0 g x D x m m = - ¼  
(see Step 1 above). Under Assumption 1-(i), Int  u P  is a C
1 manifold of dimension  1 n -  (Mas-
Colell, 1985: 4.6.9). Function g therefore is a C
1 function on a C
1 manifold of dimension 
2 1 n - , mapping into a  C
¥ manifold of dimension n. From Theorem 3, 
1 Graph  ’ (0) g j
- = . 
( ) ( ) , g x D x m m ¶ = , which is a nonsingular  n n ´  matrix at any 
**
w x P Î  by the first regularity 
condition (see Step 1 above). Therefore  ( ) rank  , g x n m ¶ =  everywhere in Graph  ’ j , that is, 0 
is  a  regular  value  of  g.  The  Regular  Value  Theorem  (see  Mas-Colell,  1985:  H.2.2)  then 
implies  that  Graph  ’ j   is  a  C
1  manifold,  whose  dimension  is  equal  to 
dim( Int  ) dim  1
n n
u P n ++ ´ - = - ℝ ℝ .  Finally,  denote  by  :  ( ) ,x h m   a  local  C
1    diffeomorphism 
1  Graph ’
n j
- ® ℝ   at  some  point  ( ) ,x m   of  Graph  ’ j ;  2 pr   the  projection 
** Graph  ’ w P j ®  
defined    by    ( ) 2 pr ,x x m = ;    and    F  function 
** Graph  ’ w P j ®   defined  by 
( ) ( ) ( )
1 ’ , x x x j
- F = . Note that  2 pr  is C
¥, while F is C
1 by Step 1 of this proof. Therefore,  
( ) 2 , pr x h m       is    a    local    C
1    diffeomorphism 
1 ** n
w P
- ® ℝ   at  ( ) ,x m ,  whose  C
1  inverse  is 
( )
1
, ( ) x h m
- F   . This completes the proof of Step 2. 
(iii) In Step 3, finally, we prove the second part of Theorem 3.  
Let L denote the set of social contract price equilibria of  ( ) , , w u w  relative to the Walrasian 
equilibrium  ( ) , p x   of  the  latter,  and  suppose  that  w x P Ï .  From  Theorem  1, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
**   { : }
nl nl
w L P z w u z w u x ++ Ç = Ç Î ³ ℝ ℝ . The continuity of w and u and the openness 
of
* *
w P  then imply that  Int L is equal to ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
** { : }
nl
w P z w u z w u x Ç Îℝ ≫ . Since  w x P Ï , 
open  set  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { : }
nl z w u z w u x Îℝ ≫   is  nonempty.  And 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
** { : }
nl
w P z w u z w u x Ç Î ³ ℝ  is nonempty by Mercier Ythier, 2009: Theorem 1-(ii). 
Therefore,  so  is  Int L  (since 
* *
w P   is  open).  Functions  i w u     being  quasi-concave,  set 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { : }
nl z w u z w u x Îℝ ≫  is convex, and is therefore an open convex subset of 
nl ℝ , 
hence is a simply connected  C
¥manifold of dimension ln. 
* *
w P  being a simply connected C
1 
manifold  of  dimension  1 n nl - <   by  Steps  1  and  2  above,  so  is  its  intersection  with 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { : }
nl z w u z w u x Îℝ ≫ . That is,  Int L is a simply connected C
1 submanifold of
* *
w P , 
of same dimension as the latter. Consequently,  ( )
1 Int L j
-  is a simply connected, open subset 
of Int  n S .■   19 
 
Note, to conclude this first subsection, that, as a straightforward consequence of definitions, if 
i w u    is strictly quasi-concave for all i (an assumption that we are not willing to make in 
general, but that proves useful below for illustrative purposes), then w w P P =
* . If, moreover, the 
social  system  is  regular  with  respect  to  distributive  efficiency,  we  have 
** Int  w w P P =   by 
Theorem 2, so that, in particular, inclusion 
** *
w w P P Ì  is proper in this case (see Proposition 2). 
Theorem  2  then  yields  a  simple  geometric  representation  of  well-behaved  social  contract 
solutions for 3-agents social systems, illustrated in Figure 1.  
The Figure exploits the following consequences of the assumptions of Theorem 2 and 
the strict quasi-concavity of functions  i w u   .  
From Assumption 1-(i)
14: u(A) is a convex subset of dimension n of  ( )
nl n u + + = ℝ ℝ ; 
function    ( ) x u x ®     is    a    homeomorphism    ( ) u u P u P ®     and  a 
1 C   diffeomorphism 
( ) Int   Int  u u P u P ® ;  the  set  of  market-efficient  ophelimity  distributions  ( )
* ( ( )) u u u P u P =  
coincides with the upper frontier of u(A), that is, with set { ( ): ’ ' ( )} û u A û û û u A Î¶ > ⇒ Ï¶ ; 
its relative interior  is a smooth (
1 C ) hypersurface (that is,  1 n -  dimensional submanifold) of 
n ℝ .  
These facts and Theorem 2 then imply that 
** ( ) w u P  is a smooth hypersurface of 
n ℝ  
contained  in  ( ) Int  u u P .  The  same  property  applies,  essentially,  to 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
** 0 Int  { ( )):   } w u L û u P w û w u x = Î ≫ , that is, to the interior of the set of ophelimity 
distributions of inclusive social contract solutions associated with initial market equilibrium 
allocation 
0 x , when the latter is not a distributive optimum: this set is a 
1 C  hypersurface of 
n ℝ  contained in 
** ( ) w u P .  
Introducing  the  additional  assumption  of  strict  quasi-concavity  of  functions  i w u    
yields the following additional properties: the ophelimity distribution that maximizes  i w  in  u P  
is unique; and  ( )
** Int  ( ) w w u P u P =  (for u is a homeomorphism  ( ) u u P u P ® , and 
** Int   w w P P =  
by the strict quasi-concavity assumption).  
In Figure 1, we denote by 
i û  the maximum of  i w  in  u P , and by 
0 û  the ophelimity 
distribution  associated  with  some  market  equilibrium  allocation 
0
w x P Ï .  From  the  facts 
above,  ( ) w u P   is  the  subarea  of  surface  ( ) Int  u u P   delimited  by  the  continuous  curves 
( ) ( ) ( ) argmax{ , : }
i j
i j u û û w û w û û P = Î   for  all  pairs  { } , i j   of  distinct  individuals  of 
{ } 1,2,3 N = .  The  set  of  ophelimity  distributions  associated  with  the  inclusive  distributive 
optima  of  the  social  system  is  the  relative  interior  of  the  former  surface,  that  is,  surface 
                                                 
14  The  convexity  of  u(A)  is  a  simple  consequence  of    assumptions  1-(i)-(b)  and  –(c)  and  the 
normalization (0) 0 u = . Function  ( ) x u x ®  is a homeomorphism  ( ) u u P u P ®  as a consequence of Assumptions 
1-(i)-(b) and -(c) (e. g. Mas-Colell, 1985: 4.6.2) and a 
1 C  diffeomorphism  ( ) Int   Int  u u P u P ®  as consequence of 
Assumption 1-(i) (Mas-Colell, 1985: 4.6.9). Equality 
* ( ) { ( ):  ’ ' ( )} u u P û u A û û û u A = Î¶ > ⇒ Ï¶  follows from the 
definition of strong market optimum and the continuity of private preferences (as implied by Assumption 1-(i)-
(a)), while equality  ( )
* ( ) u u u P u P =  follows from the strict monotonicity and continuity of private preferences (as 
implied by Assumptions 1-(i)-(a) and -(c)); its global structure of smooth  1 n-  dimensional manifold follows 
from Assumption 1-(i) by Mas-Colell, 1985: 4.6.9.    20 
( )
1 2 2 3 1 3 \( ) w u P û û û û û û È È . Finally, set  ( )
nl u L ++ Çℝ  is the subarea of the former delimited 
by the indifference curves of  2 w  and  3 w  through 
0 û , and  ( ) Int u L  is its relative interior. 
 





The three examples that we develop in this subsection exhibit four cases of social systems 
where  the  distributive  liberal  social  contracts,  while  well-defined  in  the  formal  sense  of 
Definition  4,  nevertheless  appear  degenerate  in  some  important  respects.  We  first  briefly 
summarize  their  main  characteristics,  and  next  proceed  to  the  detailed  derivation  of  their 
salient properties. 
 
The social systems of the first two examples have a representative agent, in the sense that they 
“behave” as single rational (i.e. preference-maximizing) agents.  
 
In Example 1, all individuals have the same social utility function, while they may differ in 
their  private  preferences.  These  unanimous  distributive  preferences  make  a  representative 
agent  in  the  common  sense  of  the  notion.  They  also  make  a  representative  agent  in  the 
abstract  sense  above,  as  its  individual  optimum  is  the  unique  social  contract  solution, 
irrespective  of  the  initial  distribution.  This  case  of  degeneracy  stems  from  a  conspicuous 
violation of the first regularity condition of Definition 10. 
 
In Example 2, we develop two variants of social systems from the same basic Walrasian 
exchange economy with transferable (quasi-linear) private utility.  
The  assumption  of  transferable  utility  implies  the  existence  of  a  representative 
consumer, that is, the invariance of aggregate demand to redistribution. 
  In the first variant, the social system consists of self-centred utilitarians. Distribution is 
not a relevant object for the social contract, in the sense that, with these assumptions, any 
market  optimum  is  a  distributive  optimum.  The  distributive  liberal  social  contract  then 
translates into the maximization of aggregate wealth on the one hand, and the status quo in 
distribution on the other hand. The social system is ruled, so to speak, according to the views 
of the representative consumer, which do not coincide with any of the individual views of 
actual  consumers,  but  which,  in  a  literal  sense,  coincide  with  their  sum.  This  case  of 
degeneracy involves the violation of the second regularity condition. 
  In the second variant, the social system is made of a benevolent Sovereign and his 
egoistic subjects. Individual preferences verify the first and second regularity conditions. The 
degeneracy  of  the  social  contract  proceeds  from  the  assumption  that  the  Sovereign  has 
complete control over the numeraire. He implements, consequently, his own optimum, with 
the effect of precluding the achievement of any inclusive social contract. The representative 
agent, in this last case, is the Sovereign.  
 
The social system of Example 3 has no representative agent. It is made of unsympathetically 
isolated individuals, who only feel concerned with their own wealth and welfare. It identifies, 
therefore,  with  the  Walrasian  exchange  economy  that  it  contains.  It  verifies  all  the 
assumptions of Theorem 2, and nevertheless exhibits, for obvious reasons, the same type of 
trivial status quo social contracts as the first variant of Example 2 above. 
                                                 
15 This subsection owes much to my lecture notes from Mas-Colell’s course on general equilibrium theory at 
Harvard, notably the part relative to representative consumer theory.
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Example 1: Unanimous distributive preferences 
 
Let ( ) , , w u r , verifying Assumption 1, be such that all individuals have the same distributive 
utility function 
* w . Distributive utility function 
* w  then is also the unique “social-social” 
utility  function  of  the  social  system,  that  is, 
*
i i i N w w m
Î = ∑   for  all  n S mÎ .  We  suppose, 
moreover, that 
* w  is strictly increasing and strictly concave. The social system then verifies 
all assumptions of Theorem 2, except the first regularity condition which, clearly enough, is 
violated everywhere in 
* *
w P . Function 
* w  has a unique maximum in A, which we denote by 
* x . One easily verifies that  w P , 
*
w P  and
* *
w P  then degenerate to the singleton { }
* x . The latter 
is also equal to  ( ) j m  for all  n S mÎ , so that  ( )
1 *
n x S j
- = . This example therefore exhibits a 
simple (actually, a trivial) case of violation of the properties of Theorem 2 derived from the 
sole violation of the first regularity condition.  
 
Example 2: Transferable private utility 
 
In this example, it will be convenient to adopt the setup of Balasko, 1988, that is: individual 
private preferences are defined and C
¥ on the whole of 
l ℝ , monotone, differentiably strictly 
convex and bounded from below, and the first commodity is selected as the numeraire (that is, 
its price is normalized to 1). Walrasian demand and indirect ophelimity functions are then 
well-defined  C
¥  functions  on  1 { : 1}
l p p ++ Î = ´ ℝ ℝ ,  and  we  moreover  suppose  that  the 
restrictions of the latter to  1 { : 1}
l p p ++ + Î = ´ ℝ ℝ  are of the type  ( ) ( ) , i i i i v p r r b p = + , that is, 
we  suppose  that  individuals’  private  preferences  are  quasi-linear  in  the  numeraire  for 
nonnegative consumption bundles. In other words, we consider a special case in the general 
class of exchange economies with transferable utility (Bergstrom and Varian, 1985).  
Roy’s identity and Walras Law readily imply that aggregate demand  ( , . ) i i i N f p pw
Î ∑  
is  invariant  to  redistribution,  that  is:  ( , . ) i i i N f p p w w
Î ®∑   is  constant  in  the  set  of 
nonnegative  distributions  w   such  that  i i Nw r
Î = ∑ .  There  is,  consequently,  a  unique 
equilibrium vector of market prices p
* such that  ( , . ) i i i N f p pw r
Î = ∑  (from Balasko, 1988: 
3.4.4),  that  is,  this  economy  has  a  unique  system  of  equilibrium  prices,  independent  of 
distribution  w .  Moreover,  aggregate  demand  ∑ ÎN i i i r p f ) , (   writes 
2 1 , 2 ( ( ), ( ), , ( ))
k n n k p i p i p i i N k L k i N i N r r p b p b p b p
Î Î ³ Î Î +¼+ + ¶ - ¶ ¼ - ¶ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ,  hence  is  of  the 
general  type    ( ) 1 , n G p r r +¼+ ,  so  that  the  economy  has  a  representative  consumer  for 
nonnegative  distributions  (Balasko,  1988:  7.Ann.3).  Finally,  the  set  of  market  optima 
associated  with  nonnegative  wealth  distributions  ( ) 1, , n n r r S ¼ Î   is: 
* *
1 1 1 , 2 {( ( ), ( )),
k k p p k L k r p b p b p
Î ³ + ¶ -¶ ∑
* *
2 2 1 , 2 ( ( ), ( )), ,(
k k p p n k L k r p b p b p r
Î ³ + ¶ -¶ ¼ + ∑  
( )
* *
1 1 , 2 ( ), ( )):   , , }
k k p n p n n k L k p b p b p r r S
Î ³ ¶ -¶ ¼ Î ∑ , identical to  n S  up to a simple one-to-one 
linear transformation. Abusing notations, we denote by  u P  the intersection of the latter set 
with 
nl
+ ℝ , that is, the set of nonnegative market optima.  
  We now turn to the assumptions on distribution.    22 
In  a  first  variant  of  the  Example,  we  suppose  that  all  agents  are  self-centred 
utilitarians, endowed with linear distributive utility function  : i ij j j N w û û a
Î ®∑  such that 
0 ij ii a b a a < = < =   for  all  i  and  all  j i ¹ .  Matrix  ) (û w ¶   then  is  constant,  positive, 
symmetric and has a positive dominant diagonal. The social system verifies the first regularity 
condition, as  ( ) 0 w û ¶ >  for all û  by positive diagonal dominance. But it violates the second 
regularity condition, due to the linearity of  ( ) i i i N w u m
Î ∑    in the numeraire. In view of the 
characterization  of  the  set  u P   of  nonnegative  market  optima  above,  “social-social”  utility 
functions  ( ) i i i N w u m
Î ∑    appear essentially as linear functions of the distribution of wealth. 
In  other  words,  the  wealth  of  any  pair  of  individuals  are  perfect  substitutes  relative  to 
( ) i i i N w u m
Î ∑   .  One  easily  verifies,  in  particular,  that  the  set  of  maxima  of 
( ) 1/ ( ) i i N n w u
Î ∑     in A (
nl
+ Ì ℝ ) is the whole set  u P , as  ( ) 1/ ( ) i i N n w u
Î ∑     puts the same 
weight  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1/ 1 / n n n a b + -  on all ophelimities. Denoting by
* *
w P  the set of nonnegative 
market optima, we therefore have 
**
w u P P = , which contradicts the first property of Theorem 2. 
Distribution appears essentially irrelevant as an object of social contract in this social system. 
The sole basis for unanimous agreement is the concern for market efficiency, that is, to use 
Marshall’s terminology (as this social system exhibits some of the main characteristics of 
Marshall’s  static  equilibrium),  the  concern  for  the  maximization  of  the  sum  of  private 
surpluses, or, equivalently, for the maximization of aggregate wealth (the “wealth of nation”, 
to  use  the  words  of  Adam  Smith).  Moreover,  the  set  of  allocations  unanimously  weakly 
preferred to any given  u x P Î  reduces to { } x . The distributive liberal social contract therefore 
naturally leads to status quo in this setup, in spite of the existence of distributive concerns in 
individual preferences. 
  The  second  variant  of  the  Example  is  the  macro-social  transposition  of  Becker’s 
theory of family interactions (1974).  It is illustrated by Figure 2 for a 3-agents social system. 
Agent  3  (say,  Pharao
16)  owns  the  numeraire  (that  is,  33 1 w = ),  and  has  a  concave  strictly 
increasing, differentiably strictly concave in  
n
++ ℝ  distributive utility function  3 w . All other 
individuals are egoistic as above. The determinant of  ) (û w ¶  reduces to  3 3 ( ) ( ) 0 w û w û ¶ = ¶ ¹ . 
The first regularity condition holds true, therefore, in this social system. The second regularity 
condition is also verified, by the Proposition 3 of subsection 5.3 below. We denote by 
* x  the 
unique maximum of Pharao’s social utility in the set of feasible allocations, and suppose that 
it  is  0 ≫ .  If  one  moreover  assumes,  for  simplicity,  that  the  initial  distribution  w   is  a 
Walrasian  equilibrium,  the  achievement  of  Pharao’s  optimum  then  supposes  some 
redistribution  of  wealth  and  numeraire  from  himself  to  all  others.  Therefore, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* w u x w u w ≫ , and  w x P Ï . Since Pharao has a complete control over the resources in 
numeraire, the natural distributive outcome for this social system is allocation 
* x . The latter is 
                                                 
16 From Ramsey to Ramses II, so to speak : Barro’s companion paper of Becker’s in the 82
nd issue of the JPE 
(1974) develops a macroeconomic analogue of the same model, where the representative agent is a dynastic 
sequence of altruistically related generations. This construct has often been compared, in subsequent literature on 
the  same  topic,  with  Ramsey’s  Mathematical  Theory  of  Savings  (1928).  It  seems  to  me  that,  besides  their 
undeniable practical virtues in terms of legibility and tractability, these models draw much of their obvious 
power of seduction from their metaphorical resonance with an archetype, nicely characterized by Karl Polanyi 
under the label of “redistribution” (and contrasted by him with the market on the one hand, and with reciprocity 
on the other hand: The Great Transformation, 1944, Chap. 4; see also Max Weber, 1921).     23 
a  distributive  optimum  unanimously  preferred  to  the  initial  Walrasian  equilibrium.  It 
corresponds,  consequently,  to  a  distributive  liberal  social  contract  in  the  formal  sense  of 
Definition 4. This social contract is not inclusive, and actually there cannot be any more 
exclusive  social  contract,  in  a  formal  sense,  than  this  one,  as  the  “social-social”  utility 
function that it maximizes coincides with the sole social utility function of Pharao. Figure 2 
displays the variant of Figure 1 that corresponds to this configuration of the social system: 
( ) u u P   is  represented  by  an  isosceles  triangle  of  base  2   obtained  from  S3  by  means  of 
translation  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* * *
1 2 3 1 1 2 2 3 3 , , , , z z z z b p z b p z b p ® + + +   ;  ( )
3 * û u x = ;  ( )
0 û u w = ;  the 
curve connecting points 
0 û ,  ’ û  and  ’’ û  is Pharao’s indifference curve through  ( ) u w ; and the 
set of ophelimity distributions associated with the inclusive social contract solutions such that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) w u x w u w ≫  is, consequently, the interior of surface 
3 ’ ’’ û û û . 
 
 
[Figure 2 approximately here] 
 
Example 3: Unsympathetic isolation 
 
Let  ( ) , , w u r  verify Assumption 1, and suppose that individual distributive preferences are 
non-malevolent and such that  i i w pr =  for all i in { :  for all  }
nl
i x x i er + Îℝ ≫ , where e  is a >0 
real number that can be taken arbitrarily close to 0. That is, all individuals are indifferent to 
the private wealth or welfare of others (universal distributive indifference) when all individual 
consumptions are above some  0 ≫  threshold close  to 0. We interpret this threshold as a 
survival  or  social  minimum,  and  we  let,  accordingly,  w  be  such  that 
** { :  for all  } w u i P z P z i er Ì Î ≫ . This social system verifies all the assumptions of Theorem 2, 
and notably, in particular: Assumption 2 (from non-malevolence and Assumption 1); the first 
regularity condition, since  ( ) 1n w û ¶ =  for all 
** ( ) w û u P Î ; and the second regularity condition, 
for the differentiable strict concavity of all private utility functions implies the differentiable 
strict concavity of     ( ) i i i i N x u x m
Î ®∑  for all  0 m ≫  (see Proposition 3 below). The social 
system  ( ) , , w u r  then identifies, essentially, with the Walrasian exchange economy  ( ) , u r  
whenever  the  associate  Walrasian  equilibria  match  the  norm  of  the  social  minimum.  In 
particular:  all  market  optima  above  the  social  minimum  are  distributive  optima,  that  is, 
{ :  for all  } u i w x P x i P er Î Ì ≫ ; and, of course, the distributive liberal social contract implies 
status  quo  at  all  Walrasian  equilibrium  meeting  the  norm,  that  is, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } { : } w z P w u z w u x x Î ³ =  for all  { :  for all  } u i x z P z i er Î Î ≫ . As is well-known, 
general Walrasian exchange economies, such as characterized by Assumption 1-(i), generally 
do not have representative agents (Balasko, 1988: 7.Ann.3). 
 
5.3- Regular social systems 
 
This last subsection makes a brief first exploration of the restrictions on admissible social 
systems required for a well-behaved liberal social contract solution to optimal redistribution. 
By social contract solution, we mean any distributive optimum unanimously weakly preferred 
to the initial market equilibrium (see the end of section 2), or also, by extension, the set they 
constitute.  
   24 
The social contract solutions are well-behaved if, notably: they are inclusive; they are not, or 
not  always,  a  status  quo;  and  they  make  a  simply  connected  subset  of  the  set  of  market 
optima, of same dimension as the latter (that is, of dimension  1 n - ). We consider each of 
these characteristics in turn, and some of their implications for the underlying social systems.  
 
Inclusiveness is a basic normative requirement, designed to provide a universal foundation to 
the social contract, by ensuring the effective inclusion of all individual preferences in the 
design of aggregate social utility functions. It notably implies the use of the weak Pareto 
Principle  (the  weak  distributive  preordering  of  Pareto)  for  comparing  allocations,  and, 
consequently, of the strong Pareto optimum for the definition of distributive optimum, but 
actually demands still more than that (since the inclusion 
** *
w w P P Ì  is proper, as noticed in 5.1 
above). 
  The variant of Becker’s social equilibrium analyzed in the Example 2 of subsection 
5.2  suggests  that  the  implementation  of  an  inclusive  social  contract  might  require  a 
sufficiently balanced initial distribution, or at least may be greatly eased by it. It should not be 
the case, in other words, that a single agent, or a group of agents (say, for example, “the 
Rich”)  are  able  and  willing  to  take  advantage  of  their  dominant  position  at  the  initial 
allocation,  to  implement  their  own  optimum,  so  performing  a  literal  interpretation  of 
redistribution  as  unilateral  Charity  from  benevolent  benefactors  to  passive  and  silent 
beneficiaries  (see  Mercier  Ythier,  2006,  notably  3.3.3  and  6.2,  for  a  discussion  of  the 
theoretical literature on charitable donations). Note that such exclusive social contracts are 
always  accessible  from  any  initial  market  optimum  w x P Ï   (formally, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { :   }
nl
w P z w u z w u x + ¶ Ç Î ³ ℝ  generally is nonempty, as clearly appears from Figure 
1).  The  remark  above,  therefore,  does  not  refer  so  much  to  the  logical  possibility  or 
impossibility of exclusive solutions, as to the  plausibility of the selection of an inclusive 
outcome, and to the general characteristics of the social system which condition the latter. A 
reasonably balanced initial distribution certainly is a favourable circumstance. A pervasive 
awareness of the robustness conferred to social contract by universal participation is another 
one, still more important than the former. It seems reasonable to think that the real counterpart 
of the abstract notion of  liberal social contract studied in this article, if any, supposes the both 
of them and their mutual reinforcement, in its state of maturity at least.   
 
The  second  condition  for  a  well-behaved  social  contract  is  that  it  explains  effective 
redistribution, that is, that the social contract solution is not, or not always, the status quo. In a 
minimal interpretation of this requirement, this supposes that some market optima at least are 
not distributive optima, that is, formally, that inclusion  w u P P Ì  is proper. The latter supposes 
in turn that preferences exhibit some taste for redistribution such as, for example, some degree 
of inequality aversion, at the individual level of course (see the social system of the Homo 
Economicus of Example 3), but also at the aggregate level (confer the Marshallian social 
system of Example 2). The second regularity condition of Definition 10 essentially supposes 
the latter, that is, a taste for averaging exhibited by the positively weighted sums of individual 
social utility functions at associate inclusive distributive optima. We establish below that this 
regularity condition does not impose any serious restrictions on non-malevolent individual 
distributive preferences, for two complementary reasons.  
First of all, the set of smooth (
2 C ), monotone preference preorderings on  { } \ 0
nl
+ ℝ  that 
are  differentiably  strictly  convex  in  A  is  open  and  dense  in  the  set  of  smooth  monotone 
distributive  preference  preorderings  on  { } \ 0
nl
+ ℝ ,  as  a  consequence  of  Mas-Colell,  1985: 
8.4.1, and its elements admit utility representations that are differentiably strictly concave in   25 
A, as a consequence of Mas-Colell, 1985: 2.6.4. In other words, the strict concavity of utility 
representations in the set of admissible allocations is a generic property of smooth convex 
monotone social preferences at the individual level, hence also at the aggregate level. 
 The genericity argument above is not completely satisfactory, nevertheless, as, first, it 
is mute on non-monotone (that is, malevolent) social preferences, and as, second, it derives 
the  strict  concavity  of  the  “social-social”  utility  function  from  the  strict  concavity  of 
individual social utility functions. The latter is not realistic, due to the large-scale character of 
the object of preferences (inter-individual wealth distribution in the whole society), and the 
distributive indifference that this seems normally to imply within widespread parts of their 
domain  of  definition.  Fortunately  enough,  it  can  easily  be  established  (see  Proposition  3 
below) that the concavity of individual distributive utility functions and strict concavity of 
private utility functions in A, which are much easier to defend, suffice for the strict concavity 
of  positively  weighted  sums  of  individual  social  utilities  in  A,  provided  that  individual 
distributive  utility  functions  are  monotone  (non-malevolence)  and  increasing  in  own 
ophelimity.  
The violation of the second regularity condition in the first variant of  Example 2, 
therefore,  is  not  robust,  for  it  appears  as  a  consequence  of  the  use  of  quasi-linear  utility 
representations  of  individual  private  preferences.  Robust  difficulties  with  this  regularity 
condition, if any, will stem from distributive malevolence. 
 
Proposition 3: Suppose that for all i:  i w  is concave in A, increasing, and increasing in its i-th 
argument;  i u  is strictly concave in A. Then  ( ) i i i N w u m
Î ∑    is strictly concave in A for all 
0 m ≫ . 
 
Proof: For any pair of distinct attainable allocations   ( ) , ’ x x  and  any  0 1 a < < ,  we  have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ’ 1 ’ u x x u x u x a a a a + - > + -  since the  i u  are all strictly concave in A and  i x  is 
different  from  ’ i x   for  at  least  one  i.  Therefore,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 ’ ) 1 ’ i i w u x x w u x u x a a a a + - ³ + -  for all i, with a strict inequality for any i 
such that  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ’ 1 ’ i i i u x x u x u x a a a a + - > + - , by the monotonicity assumptions. And 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ’ 1 ’ i i i w u x u x w u x w u x a a a a + - ³ + -   by  concavity  for  all  i.  Hence: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 ’ ) 1 ’ w u x x w u x w u x a a a a + - > + - .  And  therefore,  for  any  0 m ≫ : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . 1 ’   . 1 . ’ w u x x w u x w u x m a a am a m + - > + - .■ 
 
The third condition for a well-behaved social contract solution concerns the global structure 
of the solution set, as a simply connected set of dimension  1 n -  (Theorem 2-(ii)). The latter 
obtains as a simple consequence of the same properties of the set 
* *
w P  of inclusive distributive 
optima (see Step 3 of the proof of Theorem 2).  
The simple connectedness of 
* *
w P  means, essentially, that this set has no “holes”. The 
set  of  market  optima  u P   also  is  simply  connected  (Balasko,  1988:  3.2  and  3.3).  This 
mathematical property is suggestive of the possibility of performing redistribution along a 
continuous path of minimal length in  u P  or
* *
w P , by means of continuous adjustments in the 
distribution  of  endowments  (see  Balasko,  1988:  3.2  for  further  developments  of  this 
interpretation). It follows from the first and second regularity conditions of Definition 10 (see   26 
Step 1 of the proof of Theorem 2). 
The dimensional property 
** dim  1 w P n = -  states that the set of inclusive distributive 
optima  has  the  maximum  dimension    consistent    with    inclusion 
**
w u P P Ì   (since 
dim Int    1 u P n = - ).  This  corresponds  to  a  property  of  non-degeneracy  in  the  strict 
(mathematical) sense. The first regularity condition is the minimal sufficient condition for the 
latter, as appears clearly from Step 2 of the proof of Theorem 2.  This regularity condition 
supposes, essentially, that individuals have diverging views on desirable redistribution at any 
inclusive distributive optimum. More formally, the rows of matrix  )) ( ( x u w ¶  at 
**
w x P Î  are the 
Jacobian vectors  )) ( ( x u wi ¶ , pointing in the direction of the best (local) redistributions from 
( ) u x   from  the  perspective  of  individual  i.  The  first  regularity  condition  therefore  states, 
equivalently, that the families of Jacobian vectors { ( ( )): } i w u x i I ¶ Î  have maximal rank for 
any nonempty  I N Ì  at any inclusive distributive optimum. Hence the interpretation above. 
The  need  for  this  regularity  condition  is  a  direct  consequence  of  the  public  good 
character  of  private  wealth  and  welfare  distributions  in  this  setup.  The  condition  is 
automatically verified, for example, and can therefore remain implicit, in the social system of 
the  Homo  Economicus  of  Example  3  ( ( ) x u x ®   is  a  homeomorphism  ( ) u u P u P ®   for 
monotone strictly convex private preferences, as is well-known: see footnote 
14 above). The 
very existence of a distributive liberal social contract, if any, supposes a balance between: (i) 
on the one hand, some degree of conformity in individuals’ tastes for redistribution, which 
must be sufficient to imply unanimous agreement relative to some acts of redistribution at 
least; (ii) and, on the other hand, divergences in individual views relative to distribution, 
which must be sufficient to make a contractual solution meaningful, as opposed to the more 
centralized  modes  of  collective  action  that  would  proceed  from  the  exact  conformity  of 
individual distributive preferences in large subsets of N (with the social system of Example 1 
as  a  limit  case).  This  balance  of  the  social  contract  deduces  quite  naturally  from  actual 
characteristics of individual preferences, which commonly balance propensities to redistribute 
associated with altruistic feelings, empathy, or sense of distributive justice, on the one hand, 
against care for own wealth and welfare on the other hand. To put it more completely, the 
liberal social contract most naturally interprets as the reflection, at the aggregate level, and 
translation into redistributive transfers, of these characteristics of actual individual preferences 
confronted  with  actual  initial  endowment  distribution  or  actual  pre-transfer  market 
equilibrium allocation. 
  A major, if not unique, source of divergence of individual views on redistribution is 
self-centredness, which consists for an individual to put a larger weight on his own wealth 
than on the individual wealth of others, or of a suitable selection of the latter. The following 
Proposition derives, on this simple basic pattern, two assumptions on the system of individual 
social  preferences  which  imply  the  first  regularity  condition,  namely:  the  distributive 
indifference to the wealthier, which supposes that every individual puts, so to speak, a “null 
weight” on the wealth of any other individual at least as rich as himself at any inclusive 
distributive  optimum;  and  the  positive  diagonal  dominance  of  the  Jacobian  matrix  of 
( ) ( ) , r w v p r ®  at any inclusive distributive optimum. These results should only be viewed 
as simple indications about a possible line of research for obtaining general characterizations 
of systems of preferences compatible with the first regularity condition. There seems to be 
scope for substantial improvements on this topic, quite clearly. 
 
Proposition 4: Let  ( ) , , w u r  verify Assumption 1, and suppose that, for any weak price-  27 
wealth distributive optimum  ( ) , 0 p r ≫  such that  ( )
** , w f p r P Î : (i) either  ( ( , )) 0 j i i w v p r ¶ =  
for all pair of distinct individuals  ( ) , i j  such that  i j r r £ ; (ii) or matrix  ) , ( )). , ( ( r p v r p v w r ¶ ¶  
has a positive dominant diagonal. Then  ( ) , , w u r  verifies the first regularity  condition of 
Definition 10. 
 
Proof: (i) Let  ( ) , , w u r  verify the first assumption, and suppose, without loss of generality, 
that  1 2 n r r r ³ ³¼³ . Then  )) , ( ( r p v w ¶  is a triangular matrix, whose sub-diagonal entries are 
all =0. Therefore: ÕÎ ¶ = ¶
N i i i r p v w r p v w )) , ( ( )) , ( ( , which is >0 by Assumption 1-(ii)-(a). The 
conclusion  follows  from  the  equivalence  of  weak  price-wealth  distributive  and  weak 
distributive optimum (Theorem 3). 
(ii) Let ( ) , , w u r  verify the second assumption. Note that the generic entry located on the i-th 
row  and  j-th  column  of  matrix  ) , ( )). , ( ( r p v r p v w r ¶ ¶   is  ) , ( )). , ( ( j j r i j r p v r p v w
j ¶ ¶ .  The 
multilinearity  of  the  determinant  therefore  implies  that:    ( ( , )). ( , ) r w v p r v p r ¶ ¶ = 
( ( , )) ( ( , ))
i r i i i N v p r w v p r
Î ¶ ¶ Õ ,  where  Õ Î ¶
N i i i r r p v
i ) , (   is  >0.  The  diagonal  dominance 
assumption implies that  ) , ( )). , ( ( r p v r p v w r ¶ ¶  is >0. Therefore  )) , ( ( r p v w ¶  is >0, and the 
conclusion  follows  from  the  equivalence  of  weak  price-wealth  distributive  and  weak 
distributive optimum as above.■ 
 
6- Social contract equilibrium 
 
We very briefly return, to conclude the formal developments of this article, on the notion of 
social contract equilibrium.  
 
The set of social contract solutions studied in this article leaves, when it is well-behaved, a 
substantial amount of mathematical indeterminacy relative to distribution, as measured by the 
dimension ( 1 n = - ) of the manifold of price-wealth social contract equilibria or, equivalently, 
by the dimension of the set of supporting vectors of weights of the associate “social-social” 
utility  functions  (Theorem  2-(ii)).
17  A  natural  solution  for  removing  this  remaining 
indeterminacy  in  our  setup  is  Lindahl  equilibrium,  construed  as  a  process  of  social 
communication which uses  Lindahl pricing to elicit and coordinate individual preferences 
relative to distribution treated as a public good. Mercier Ythier, 2004, defines the notion, and 
analyzes its existence and some of its determinacy properties in the one-commodity case.
18 
                                                 
17 Note that indeterminacy in the sense above does not preclude a substantial explanation power of the notion, as 
measured by the ratio of the magnitude of hypersurface  ( ) u L , computed from the relevant integral, relative to 
the magnitude of hypersurface  ( ) w u P  or  ( ) u u P  (see Figure 1 and the associate remarks, following the proof of 
Theorem 2). In other words, the set of social contract solutions could represent a very small fraction of the set of 
Pareto-efficient distributions in the distributive sense and, a fortiori, in the market sense. This might be the case, 
notably, if the initial market allocation is close to the set of distributive optima, or, equivalently, if the value of 
the transfers of the social contract represents a small fraction of the total value of the equilibrium allocation. This 
could very well be the case in practice, as genuine redistribution seem to represent only a small fraction of 
aggregate market wealth in real economies.  
18  This notion of Lindahl equilibrium reduces to the standard notion in the general equilibrium model with 
public goods of footnote 
4 above, when there is a single private commodity. This simple fact is established in 
Mercier Ythier, 2006: Theorem 16-(i). The footnote 
70 of the same reference also translates into this setup 
(general equilibrium with public goods and a single private commodity) Foley’s 1970 proof that his notion of 
core with public goods contains the Lindahl equilibria. Note that the Foley-core necessarily is contained in the   28 
We extend it to the present setup in Definition 11 below, and establish, as a corollary of 
Theorem 1, that it actually yields an inclusive social contract solution. The associate wealth 
distribution, moreover, is unanimously strictly preferred to the wealth distribution induced by 
the initial market equilibrium allocation evaluated at social equilibrium market prices, when 
the initial market equilibrium allocation is not itself an inclusive distributive optimum. These 
properties  of  social  equilibrium  hold  true  provided  that  indirect  individual  social  utility 
functions  ( ) ( ) , i r w v p r ®   exhibit  suitable  properties  of  preference  for  averages  at  social 
equilibrium market prices.  
 
We let P denote set   ( ) 1 { , , : 1 for all  }
n
n ij i N i N j p p p p
Î Î = ¼ Î = Õ ∑ ℝ . 
 
Definition 11: 
* * ( , , ) l p x S A p ÎP´ ´  is a social contract equilibrium of ( ) , , w u w , relative to 
competitive  market  equilibrium  with  free  disposal 
0 0 ( , ) p x   of  ( ) , , w u w ,  if: 
(i)
* 0 ( ( )) ( ( )) w u x w u x ³ ; (ii) 
* x  is a market price equilibrium supported by 
* p ; (iii) and for all 
i,  
* * * * *
1 ( . ,..., . ) n r p x p x =  maximizes 
* ( ( , )) i r w v p r ®  in 
* 0 * 0
1 { : . .( . ,..., . )}
n
i i n r r p x p x p p + Î £ ℝ . 
 
The notion differs from the social contract price equilibrium of Definition 9 by maintaining 
the  initial  market  equilibrium  allocation  x
0  in  the  specification  of  the  right-hand  side  of 
individual  “budget  constraints”.  It  shares  with  the  former  the  fundamental  feature  of 
endorsing  the  separation  of  allocation  and  distribution  as  autonomous  processes  of 
coordination  of:  (i)  on  the  one  hand,  individual  decisions  relative  to  market  demand, 
coordinated by market prices for given distribution;  (ii) and on the other hand, individual 
choices relative to distribution, coordinated by Lindahl shares for given market prices. 
 
Corollary: Let ( ) , , w u w  verify Assumption 1, and suppose moreover that: for all  n S mÎ  and 
all  ( )
n û u A ++ Î Çℝ ,  ( ) 0 i i i N w û m
Î ¶ ¹ ∑ ;  and  for  all  0 p ≫   and  all  i N Î ,  function 
( ( , )) i r w v p r ®  is quasi-concave in 
n
++ ℝ . If 
* * ( , , ) p x p  is a social contract equilibrium of 
( ) , , w u w , relative to competitive market equilibrium with free disposal 
0 0 ( , ) p x  of ( ) , , w u w , 
such that 
* 0 x ≫ , then endowment distribution 
* * x w =  is, both: (a) an inclusive distributive 
optimum of  ( ) , , w u r ; (b) and an inclusive distributive liberal social contract of  ( ) , , w u w , 
relative  to  competitive  market  equilibrium  with  free  disposal 
0 0 ( , ) p x   of  ( ) , , w u w .  If, 
moreover, 
0 **
w x P Ï   and 
* ( ( , )) i r w v p r ®   is  strictly  quasi-concave  for  all  i,  then 
* * * 0 * 0
1 ( ( )) ( ( ,( . ,..., . ))) n w u x w v p p x p x ≫ .  
 
Proof: Let 
* * ( , , ) p x p  be a social contract equilibrium of  ( ) , , w u w , relative to competitive 
market equilibrium with free disposal 
0 0 ( , ) p x  of  ( ) , , w u w , such that 
* 0 x ≫ , and denote 
* * * * *
1 ( . ,..., . ) n r p x p x = . Function 
* ( ( , )) i r w v p r ®  being strictly  increasing in  i r , the budget 
constraint  must  be  satiated  at  any  of  its  maxima  in 
* 0 * 0
1 { : . .( . ,..., . )}
n
i i n r r p x p x p p + Î £ ℝ . 
Therefore 
* * 0 * 0
1 . .( . ,..., . ) i i n r p x p x p p = ,  and 
* r   also  is  a  maximum  of 
* ( ( , )) i r w v p r ®   in 
                                                                                                                                                         
set of distributive liberal social contract solutions when the private commodity is unique (Mercier Ythier, 2006: 
footnotes 
62 and 
69).   29 
* { : . . }
n
i i r r r p p + Î £ ℝ .  Hence 
* x   is  a  0 ≫   social  contract  price  equilibrium  of  ( ) , , w u w , 
relative to competitive market equilibrium with free disposal 
0 0 ( , ) p x  of  ( ) , , w u w , and the 
first part of the Corollary follows from the application of Theorem 1. 
  Suppose that, moreover, 
0 **
w x P Ï  and 
* ( ( , )) i r w v p r ®  is strictly quasi-concave for all 
i. We have 
* * * 0 * 0
1 ( ( )) ( ( ,( . ,..., . ))) n w u x w v p p x p x ³ , 
* r  being a maximum of  
* ( ( , )) i r w v p r ®  
in 
* 0 * 0
1 { : . .( . ,..., . )}
n
i i n r r p x p x p p + Î £ ℝ  for all i by definition of a social contract equilibrium. 
Suppose  that 
* * * 0 * 0
1 ( ( )) ( ( ,( . ,..., . ))) i i n w u x w v p p x p x =   for  some  i,  and  let  us  derive  a 
contradiction. The strict quasi-concavity of 
* ( ( , )) i r w v p r ®  implies that any strict convex 
combination  ( )
* * 0 * 0
1 1 ( . ,..., . ) n r p x p x a a + - , 0 1 a < < , is strictly preferred by i to both 
* r  and 




n x p x p   (since 
* * * * * 0 * 0
1 ( ( , )) ( ( )) ( ( ,( . ,..., . ))) i i i n w v p r w u x w v p p x p x = = .  Since 
moreover  ( )
* * 0 * 0 * 0 * 0
1 1 1 ( . ,..., . ) { : . .( . ,..., . )}
n
n i i n r p x p x r r p x p x a a p p + + - Î Î £ ℝ , 
* r  cannot be a 
maximum  of   
* ( ( , )) i r w v p r ®   in 
* 0 * 0
1 { : . .( . ,..., . )}
n
i i n r r p x p x p p + Î £ ℝ ,  which  yields  the 
wished contradiction.■ 
 
Let us mention, to finish with, an interesting open question, namely, whether the type of 
rational redistribution implied by the social equilibrium concept above introduces sufficient 
regularity in income effects to imply the law of demand (that is, a negative semi-definite 
Slutsky matrix) for aggregate market demand at social contract equilibrium. This would open  
new  perspectives  for  the  study  of  the  relations  between  allocation,  distribution  and  the 
dynamics and regulation of economic equilibrium, in a setup richer, if not more tractable, than 
the models of representative agent that have been developed on this subject in the last twenty 




This  article  has  examined  the  rational  foundation  of  the  distributive  (and,  by  extension, 
productive) welfare state on the liberal social contract. The latter deduces from the unanimous 
agreement of individual members of society, as follows from their actual preferences and 
rights, including their common concerns relative to the distribution of wealth. We notably 
elicit general conditions over preferences and rights which make the liberal social contract an 
interesting, non trivial solution to the public good problem of redistribution. The analysis 
relies, in the main, on the precise formulation of the integration of (rational) social contract 
redistribution  with  (competitive)  market  equilibrium.  It  introduces  new  questions  on  the 
implications  of  the  (partial)  rational  control  of  wealth  distribution  in  the  social  contract 
redistribution for market functioning (the combination of income effects in the determination 
of  aggregate  demand,  notably)  and,  consequently,  for  the  interaction  of  the  allocation, 
distribution and regulation branches of public finance. 
 
Appendix: First-order conditions for distributive efficiency 
 
For the reader’s commodity, we reproduce below, as Theorem 3, the characterization of weak 
distributive optima derived in Mercier Ythier, 2009: Theorems 1 and 2 and proofs.  
 
Theorem 3: Let  ( ) , , w u r  verify Assumptions 1 and 2. The following three propositions are 
then  equivalent:  (i)  x  is  a  weak  distributive  optimum  ( ) , , w u r ;  (ii)  x  is  0 ≫ ,  such  that   30 
i i N x r
Î = ∑ ,  and  there  exists  ( ) ,
l
n p S m ++ Î ´ℝ   such  that,  for  all  j N Î , 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1/ , . 0
j i j i r j j i N w u x v p p x m
Î ¶ = ¶ > ∑   and  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )   i j i j j i N w u x u x p m
Î ¶ ¶ = ∑ ; (iii) there 
exists  n S mÎ  such that x maximizes  ( ) i i i N w u m
Î ∑    in A.  
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